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Case No. 20160485-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, 370 P.3d 942 (Addendum A). 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) 
(West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner DeSean Goins separately accosted two homeless men in 
Pioneer Park with a knife. Both victims testified at the preliminary hearing, 
and Goins cross-examined them without limitation. Estrada did not appear 
for h 4 ial, and, despite diligent efforts, the State was unable to locate him. 
The trial court found Estrada unavailable and admitted his preliminary 
hearing testhnony over Goins' confrontation objection. 
Goins appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that 
confrontation was satisfied under Crawford v. Washington because Estrada 
was unavailable and Goins had both a prior opportunity and a similar 
motive to cross-examine him at the preliminary hearing. 
The court of appeals' ruling is consistent with a long, unbroken line of 
cases from both the United States Supreme Court and this Court holding 
that a preliminary hearing can afford an adequate opportunity for prior 
cross-examination. Goins shows no compelling reason to depart from this 
precedent. 
Through new counsel, Goins sought rehearing to challenge his 
appellate counsel's effectiveness for failing to challenge on appeal h·ial 
counsel's effectiveness in submitting an erroneous self-defense jury 
instruction. The court of appeals properly denied the petition because it 
exceeded the scope of rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That 
decision is consistent with this Court's long-standing precedent. Goins 
reJ.?1-ains able to pursue his ineffectiveness claims on post-conviction review. 
While this Court could, in its discretion, decide to entertain Goins' s 
challenges on certiorari review, it should require that Goins pursue post-
conviction review, especi~lly where his claims do not establish appellate 
counsel's ineffectiveness. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court granted review on two questions. 
1. "Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that a witness 
whose preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at trial was unavailable 
and that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment 
right to confront witnesses against him was violated by the presentation of 
the preliminary hearing testimony at his trial." Order, September 12, 2016. 
2. "Whether the court of appeals erred in denying Petitioners petition 
for rehearing raising new arguments that trial and appellate counsel 
provided ineffective assistance." Order, September 12, 2016. 
Standard of R_eview. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision 
for correctness. Brierly v. Layton City, 2016 UT 46, ,I18, _ P.3d _. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum B: 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI; 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §12; 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35; 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 14; 
Utah Rules of Evidence 804. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 
Gabriel Estrada (Count 3): 
Gabriel Estrada needed a place to sleep and thought he would "be 
safe" at an apartment belonging to his friend Star and Petitioner Desean 
Goins. R202:2-4, 9-10. He slept at the apartment for several nights in July 
2013, but wasn't comfortable being there long. R202:9-912. 
The morning of July 13, Estrada woke up, got ready, and left the 
apartment, heading for the men's shelter in downtown Salt Lake City. 
R202:5-7, 10-11. Goins and Star found him outside the shelter later that 
morning. R202:4, 10-11. Goins approached Estrada waiving a knife, 
cussing, and accusing him in "vulgar" language of taking Goins' s cell 
phone. R202:6-7, 11-12. Esh·ada denied taking the phone, told Goins it was 
Goins's problem, and walked away. R202:7, 12. 
Joshua Omar (Counts 1 and 2): 
Joshua Omar was living at the n1en's shelter in July 2013. R167:121. 
He was "[v]ery close to Gabriel [Estrada] and considered. him to be his 
"street son." R167:124-25. Estrada, in turn, considered Omar to be his 
"street mother." R167:124. 
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On July 13, 2013, Omar was sleeping on his blanket in Pioneer Park 
when his friend Star woke him up, asking if he had seen Estrada because 
Estrada allegedly had stolen Goins' s cell phone from Goins' s apartment. 
R167:121-24. Goins, holding a sling bag and waiving a knife, started 
making the same accusations from ten or twelve feet away fr01n Omar. 
R167:125-26; State's Exh. 1. But Goins moved closer as he spoke, 
threatening that Omar had "better tell the truth.'' R167:126. When Goins 
stepped onto Omar's blanket, he violated Omar's personal boundaries, and 
Omar shoved him away. R167:125, 127. 
In response, Goins "attacked" Omar, lunging at the unarmed man. 
R167:127, 143, 154. The two ended up on the ground wrestling and 
throwing punches at each other. R167:127, 143-45, 154, 160-61. At one 
point, Omar got on top of Goins and pinned him to the ground. R167:127, 
140, 144. Goins grabbed Omar's right earlobe between his teeth, yanked his 
head back, bit off the earlobe, and spit it out on the ground. R167:127-28; 
State's Exh. 3, 4, 6-8. Omar reached for his ear, saw the blood, and realized 
what had happened. R167:128, 140-41. He hit Goins once more, then stood 
up. R167:129-30. 
As Goins stood, he grabbed his knife fro1n where it had fallen on the 
ground. R167:141-42. The two men yelled at each other and ran around the 
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blanket before stopping on opposite sides. R167:130, 141-44. Goins lunged 
twice at the unarmed Omar with the knife, stabbing him once on the upper 
left side of his torso. R167:131, 139, 141, 145, 154, 156; State's Exh. 9. Omar 
then left to get help at the nearby police station while Star led Goins away 
from the park. R167:129, 131, 155-56, 158. 
As Donald Myers parked his car next to Pioneer Park, he noticed a 
fight between two men about ten feet away from his car. R167:151-52. He 
watched the men fight until he saw Goins holding a knife. R167:152-55. He 
immediately called 911. R167:55. It appeared to Myers that Omar was 
defending himself while Goins-who appeared motivated by anger and 
was yelling about a phone-was the aggressor. R167:157, 159. 
A responding officer stopped Goins and Star near the park and found 
a knife inside Goins' s bag. R167:165-67. He noted several "very small" cuts 
like scratches on Goins's face suggesting that Goins had recently been in a 
fight. R167:169-71. Goins told the officer that he had been fighting with 
Omar, that he bit Omar's ear to get Omar off of him, and that he stabbed 
Omar with the knife in self-defense. R167:174-76. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
The State charged Goins with two counts of aggravated assault, both 
third-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103(1) (West 
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Supp. 2014), and one count of second-degree felony mayhem, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-105 (West 2004). R16-18. 
The Preliminary Hearing. Both victims testified at a preliminary 
hearing seven weeks after the charged assaults. R23-24; R202. Goins' 
counsel cross-examined Estrada without objection by the State or restriction 
by the judge. R202:2-13. The prosecutor's questioning spans about six 
pages; defense counsel's cross spans five pages. Id. The judge found 
probable cause and bound Goins over as charged. R23-24; R202:33. 
Pre-trial. Two 1nonths later, the parties appeared for the first day of 
trial only to discover they had no jury pool and could not proceed that day. 
R166:2-3. The parties and the trial court decided to proceed with trial the 
next day, on what would have been day two of the originally scheduled 
trial. R166:2-3. The prosecutor then took the opportunity to acknowledge 
that Estrada had not appeared for trial and moved that he be declared 
unavailable and that his preliminary hearing testimony be admitted at trial 
the next day. R166:3 (argument and ruling in Addendum C). The 
prosecutor explained that because both victims in this case were homeless 
and had no phones, they were difficult to locate and required "creative" 
efforts. R166:3-4; R167:16. Accordingly, before the prelim.inary hearing, the 
prosecutor had used the Salt Lake City Bike Police to look for the men based 
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largely on a description of Omar's missing earlobe. R166:3-4. Both men 
were found, appeared at the hearing, and brought with them a pastor from 
the K-2 Church who dealt with community outreach-getting to know the 
people in the area and helping them when needed. Id. The prosecutor took 
the opportunity to arrange for the pastor to be the contact person for both 
men so they could be notified through him of a trial date. R166:4. Both men 
agreed, and the prosecutor remained in contact with the pastor. Id. 
The· prosecutor later emailed the subpoenas for both victims to the 
pastor, expressly including both days of the scheduled two-day trial. 
R166:4; R167:10, 16. Thereafter, the pastor informed the prosecutor that he 
had, in fact, served both subpoenas on the victims and informed them that 
they needed to be at the trial. 1 R166:4. 
The prosecutor maintained contact with the pastor as trial neared to 
ensure that both victims were still available. Id. At one point, the pastor 
mentioned that Estrada had "come into some trouble" but was still around. 
Id. The pastor left for a new job shortly thereafter, and the prosecutor dealt 
with the replacement pastor, Jason. Id. 
Jason verified that the previous pastor had served the subpoena on 
Estrada and that Estrada had been in jail. Id. When the prosecutor followed 
1 No return of service appears in the record. 
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up on the information, he found that Estrada had been released from jail 
nearly a month before trial. R166:4-5. The prosecutor checked the jail twice 
more before trial, but did not locate Estrada. Id. 
Both Jason and Omar later told the prosecutor that they had lost 
contact with Estrada. Id. Omar and Estrada had "a falling out," and neither 
Omar nor Jason knew where to find Estrada. R166:5. Estrada stopped 
hanging around the area, was not involved with his normal "crowd," and 
did not get in touch with either Jason or Omar. R166:5. Although the 
prosecutor requested that Jason watch for Estrada, Jason did not see him in 
the days leading up to trial. Id. 
Goins accepted the prosecutor's proffer of his efforts to serve Estrada 
and get him to appear at trial and argued that they were insufficient under 
rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. R166:6, 12. He also argued that 
permitting use of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony would violate 
Goins' s constitutional right to confrontation because the motive for cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing was different than would exist at 
trial, where credibility was a factor. R166:9-11. 
The judge found that Estrada was unavailable under rule 804. 
R166:12. Specifically, the judge found that the State utilized a "reasonable 
means of process," its efforts succeeded in actually informing Estrada of the 
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trial dates, and Estrada was present at the preliminary hearing and, thus, 
knew that the proceedings were moving forward. R166:12-13. 
Further, the judge found that Goins enjoyed a meaningful 
opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing where his 
counsel actively examined Estrada without objection or restriction and 
asked about the "exact incidents" that were at issue at trial. R166:18-19. 
Rule 804 requires nothing more, she noted. R166:19. Accordingly, the judge 
held that Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony could be used at trial 
without violating Goins' s constitutional confrontation rights. Id. 
Trial. At trial the next day, Estrada again failed to appear. R267:3-4. 
Goins unsuccessfully renewed his objection to admission of Estrada's 
preliminary hearing testimony. Id. The jurors heard an audio tape of 
Estrada's testimony during the State's case. R167:149-50. After a day of 
testimony, they acquitted Goins of mayhem, convicted him of aggravated 
assault involving Omar, and convicted him of the lesser offense of using or 
threatening to use a dangerous weapon in the fight with Estrada. R73, 75-
76; R168:52. 
Court of Appeals' decision. Goins timely appealed, arguing both (1) that 
Estrada was not "unavailable" where the State made no good faith effort to 
locate him and to properly serve him with a subpoena; and (2) that he did 
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not have the requisite opportunity or similar motive to fully cross-examine 
Estrada at the preliminary hearing. Aplt.Br. 5-16. Goins argued that the 
preliminary hearing was an inadequate opportunity for cross-examination 
for three reasons: the absence of a right to confront witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing; the limited purpose of a preliminary hearing; and the 
different motive his counsel possessed for cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing. Id. 
The court of appeals-consistent with its own, this Court's, and 
United States Supreme Court precedent-disagreed. Goins, 2016 UT App 
57, ,r,rB-20 (in Add. A). The court first explained that Utah law requires that 
the State make "every reasonable effort" to procure the witness but did not 
require that '" every lead, no matter how nebulous,"' "'be tracked to the 
ends of the earth."' Id. at ,r,r9-10, 14 (quoting Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329,331 
(10th Cir. 1974)). Comparing this case with precedent from both Utah 
appellate courts, the court of appeals determined that the State "went to 
considerable effort" in this case to obtain Estrada's testimony at trial, 
including maintaining a connection with Estrada through a person whom 
he trusted, getting a subpoena to Estrada through that person, and, after 
~strada disappeared, trying to locate him through the most likely means 
possible, right to "the eve of trial." Id. at ,r,rl0-13, 15. The court also 
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acknowledged that in addition to the State's reasonable actions, Goins 
acquiesced in both the State's method of keeping in touch with Estrada and 
the means of serving him a subpoena. Id. at if 15. Consequently, the court 
detennined that the State made the necessary reasonable efforts to locate 
Estrada and affirmed the finding of unavailability. Id. 
The court also rejected Goins' s challenge to the preliminary hearing 
itself. First, the court explained that preliminary hearing testimony of an 
unavailable witness was admissible at trial under rule 804(b)(1)(B), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, because the circumstances of a preliminary hearing 
"'closely approximat[e] those"' of a typical trial. Id. at if16 (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970)). Further, the court held that the 
rule required the opportunity for cross-examination, not the exercise of that 
opportunity, and that a preliminary hearing provides "an effective 
opportunity for confrontation." Id. at if if17-18. Goins had that opportunity 
in this case. Id. at 118. 
Finally, the court of appeals sympathized with Goh1s' s claim that the 
limited purpose of the preliminary hearing-determination of probable 
cause-dictated a motive for her cross-examination at that hearing that 
differed from the motive she would later have at trial. Id. at ,119. But the 
court found the argument foreclosed by this Court's decision in State v. 
-12-
C.'.1 .., 
Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), which Goins did not address. Id. at ,I,I19-
20. Because Brooks rejected identical arguments and held that both 
proceedings involved the motivation of establishing the innocence of the 
accused,· the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of 
Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony. Id. at if 20. 
Rehearing petition. Goins obtained new counsel and filed a petition for 
rehearing, urging the court of appeals to consider new issues: the accuracy 
of a self-defense jury instruction, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
proposing the instruction, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for 
not challenging the instruction and trial counsel's effectiveness on direct 
appeal. Rehearing Pet. 3-11. The court of appeals sought input from the 
parties about the propriety of raising new issues in a rehearing petition 
(Order dated April 25, 2016), then denied the petition without elaboration 
(Order dated May 17, 2016). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: Goins argues that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed 
the use of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony at trial. He claims 
Estrada was not unavailable because: (1) Estrada was not formally 
subpoenaed; and (2) the preliminary hearing did not provide Goins an 
opportunity for cross-examination with a motive similar to that used for 
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trial. His claim that the limited nature of the preliminary hearing renders 
any opportunity for cross-examination inadequate contradicts over a 
century of precedent from the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and 
the court of appeals. Goins provides no compelling reason to depart from 
this precedent. Instead, the long, unbroken line of precedent provides that 
his opportunity to cross-examine Estrada at the preliminary hearing 
satisfied the confrontation clause. Thus, Goins does not show that the use at 
trial of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony violated Goins' s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses. 
Issue II: The court of appeals properly denied Goins' s rehearing 
petition which sought review of new clailns of ineffective assistance of trial 
and appellate counsel. The new claims were outside the scope of rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because they were neither" overlooked" 
nor "misapprehended" by the court of appeals in its published decision. 
Further, the court's decision was consistent with long-standing decisions 
from this Court. Finally, a procedure already exists for presentations of 
Goins's claims which he should follow. Because the court of appeals 
properly denied the rehearing petition, this Court should affirm without 
proceeding further. 
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Should this Court proceed, it could, but should not, consider the 
merits of Goins' s new claims because a remedy already exists and because 
the claims establish no reversible error to justify unusual any treatment. 
In any event, Goins establishes neither deficient performance nor 
prejudice in the handling of jury instruction 24 regarding self-defense. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT ESTRADA WAS UNAVAILABLE AT TRIAL AND 
THAT GOINS HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE HIM AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Goins argues that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed the 
admission of Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony at h·ial. Pet.Br. 9-32. 
He contends that use of the testimony violated his right to confrontation 
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions because: (1) the witness 
cannot be unavailable where the prosecution failed to formally subpoena 
him; and (2) the preliminary hearing did not provide the requisite 
opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness as required by rule 804, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Id. 
Goins is mistaken on both points. First, formal service of a subpoena 
is not a 1nandatory prerequisite to a finding of unavailability; rather, the 
State must merely make every reasonable effort to produce the witness. The 
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prosecutor used ample reasonable means to procure the homeless witness's 
attendance at trial, including but not limited to informal service of a 
subpoena. The finding of unavailability was, therefore, correct. 
Second, not only Brooks, but a long unbroken line of decisions from 
both the United States Supreme Court and this Court show that preliminary 
hearing testimony can be admissible at trial where the declarant is 
unavailable. Goins offers no cmnpelling reason to depart from that 
precedent. 
A. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant 
has long been admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an 
accused's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" at trial. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, iJ 9, 218 P.3d 590. 
But this right is not absolute. The Confrontation Clause does not bar the use 
of all hearsay at trial, but only of "testimonial" hearsay. Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). A hearsay statement is "testimonial" if, 
in making it, the declarant "bears testimony" against a defendant. Id. at 51. 
Testimonial hearsay includes, among other things, "prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 59, 68. 
But even testimonial hearsay is admissible at h·ial if (1) the declarant 
is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
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cross-examine the declarant regarding the prior statements. Id. at 68. Prior 
testimony-whether given at a prior trial or a preliminary hearing-has 
long been admissible where these conditions are met. Id. at 57 ( citing 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241 (1895)); see also State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 403 (1994). 
Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, expressly provides for the 
admission of prior testimony if both conditions are satisfied. Utah R. Evid. 
804(b)(1); State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ~17, 314 P.3d 1014, cert. denied 
320 P.3d 676 (2014). It states that a witness is unavailable if, as is relevant 
here, he "is absent from the trial" and the State "has not been able, by 
process or other reasonable means, to procure the [witness's] attendance." 
Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5); Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ~17. It "'must be 
practically impossible to produce the witness in court. It is not enough to 
show that the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand or that 
testifying would be stressful. Every reasonable effort must be made to 
produce the witness."' State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r1s, 84 P.3d 1183 
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(quoting State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1113 (Utah 1989)); see also State v. 
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890,893 (Utah App. 1990)/ 
B. The absent, homeless witness was unavailable to testify at 
trial. 
Goins contests the court of appeals' determination that the 
prosecution made every reasonable effort to procure Estrada's attendance at 
trial. Pet.Br. 11. He claims that Estrada was not unavailable because the 
State never sought to "actually serve a subpoena upon him" by 
"conventional means." Id. at 10-11. But formal service of a subpoena is not 
a prerequisite to an unavailability finding, and Goins fails to challenge the 
reasonableness of the other efforts the prosecution made to keep tabs on 
2 Goins claims that this unavailability standard is "perhaps" even 
"more stringent" than the federal standard under the Confrontation Clause, 
and that the federal Confrontation Clause standard itself requires a 
"stronger showing of unavailability and reliability than does evidentiary 
Rule 804." Pet.Br. 14-15. 
Goins is mistaken. First, his sole support for a "stronger" federal 
constitutional standard is dicta in a footnote in a Fifth Circuit case saying 
the Confrontation Clause "may" require a sh·onger showing of 
unavailability and reliability than does federal rule 804. Id. at 14 ( citing 
Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69, 72, n.3 (5th Cir. 1995)). But Ecker neither develops 
nor applies a "stronger showing" for unavailability. 
Second, the state standard Goins labels "more stringent" than the 
federal standard is actually the federal standard- Webb based its holding on 
its reading of federal precedent. See 779 P.2d at 1113. Goins cites no case 
interpreting the standard more stringently than the federal standard from 
which it derives. Thus, Goins provides no basis for a separate state 
constitutional review, and this Court should proceed under the standard 
recited above. See Drawn, 791 P.2d at 893, n2. 
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Estrada and ensure his presence at trial, including: repeatedly checking with 
the pastor to ensure both Estrada's continued presence in the area and his 
continued link to the prosecutor through the pastor; repeatedly checking the 
jails once informed Estrada was having trouble and had been arrested; 
alerting those who were familiar with Estrada and were most likely to see 
him to watch for him; and making a final check with the jail the eve before 
trial. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ~14. 
It has long been true in Utah that Rule 804(a)(5) does not require "' a 
patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential witness ... whose 
physical location and address are completely unknown."' Id. at iJ10 
(quoting Brown v. Harn; Heathman, Inc., 744 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Utah App 
1987)). The Heathman court expressly rejected a claim that under the rule, 
the proponent of such testimony "must always attempt service of process." 
744 P.2d at 1018. As Heathman noted, the rule itself is phrased in the 
disjunctive: a witness is deemed "unavailable" where the party sought to 
procure the witness's attendance "by process or other reasonable means." 
Id. (quoting Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5)) (emphasis added). See also State v. 
Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645-46 (Utah 1995) (finding efforts to be satisfactory 
without service of process). Goins acknowledges this law, but fails to 
discuss or refute it, and offers no contrary authority expressly requiring 
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formal service of process as a prerequisite to all unavailability 
determinations under the·rule. Pet.Br. 11. 
Goins claims that the prosecution ignored two opportunities to 
attempt formal service on Estrada, and thereby fell short of the effort 
required to establish unavailability. Id. at 11-13. But Goins has not 
established that service by "conventional means" was even possible. The 
fact that the pastor was able to serve Estrada does not show that an officer 
would "surely" have succeeded in attempting to do the same. Id. at 12. 
Esh·ada was homeless. His physical location and address were never 
known and he had no phone. No one knew where to find him at any given 
time. The prosecutor was not aware of his presence in the jail until after he 
had been released. R166:4-5. Unlike Omar, Estrada had no distin~tive 
attributes to enable officers to locate him, and there was no reason to believe 
he would allow officers to approach him. Reliance on the pastor was the 
most likely avenue of successful service and, hence, was reasonable under 
the circumstances. 
In any event, the issue is not whether additional avenues of service 
were available to the prosecutor; it is whether the prosecutor's efforts were 
reasonable. See Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5); see also Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403. 
Even accepting Goins' view that the pastor's service on the witness was 
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flawed, the pastor's effort clearly qualified as "other reasonable means" 
which in fact accomplished what "proper" service would have 
accomplished, informing the witness of the time and place of trial and his 
need to attend. See Utah R. Evid. 801(1)(5). That was the proffer given by 
the prosecutor, accepted by Goins, and credited by the judge, who 
acknowledged that the witness's actual knowledge of the information was 
"key" to her ruling. R166:12-13. That was all the constitution requires. 
In this Court, for the first time, Goins argues that the court of appeals 
should have reversed the trial court's unavailability finding because the 
prosecution failed to give timely notice of the witness's expected 
unavailability. Pet.Br. 16-17. This claim does not warrant review, not only 
because it was not timely raised, but because it lacks support. See DeBry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address on certiorari review 
a claim not raised in the court of appeals or originating in that court's 
challenged decision). It rests solely on a Massachusetts case dealing with a 
witness who was deemed unavailable due to illness. Commonwealth v. 
Housewright, 25 N.E.3d 273, 283 (Mass. 2015) (reversing the unavailability 
finding for reasons other than the lack of notice). The analysis in that case 
has no bearing on the availability of the homeless witness in this case. 
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The State need not demonstrate that it did everything humanly 
possible to procure the presence of a witness at trial; it need only use 
"reasonable means" to procure his attendance. Utah R. Crim. P. 804(a)(5); 
Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ifl7. The prosecution's conduct under the facts 
here meets that standard. Accordingly, the court of appeals properly 
affirmed the trial court's determination that Estrada was unavailable at trial. 
C. Preliminary hearings can provide an adequate opportunity for 
cross-examining a witness who is later deemed unavailable at 
trial. 
Goins argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that the 
preliminary hearing provided the requisite "opportunity and similar 
motive" to develop cross-examination of Estrada for purposes of both rule 
804 and the Confrontation Clause.3 Pet.Br. 19-31. He argues that the nature 
and purpose of the preliminary hearing in Utah differs substantially from a 
trial, that defense counsel often pursue their cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing with motives which are wholly dissimilar to their 
motives for cross-examination at h·ial, and that the viability of the per se rule 
in Brooks that was relied on by the court of appeals in their decision in this 
case is "heavily in doubt." Id. 
3 It should be noted that Goins' s trial counsel conceded that he had 
the opportunity to examine Estrada at · the preliminary hearing and 
proceeded to challenge only the motive for the examination. R166:10; 
Pet.Br. 19. 
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Goins is mistaken. Not only Brooks, but a long, unbroken line of 
decisions from both the United States Supreme Court and this Court show 
that preliminary hearing testimony can be admissible at trial where the 
declarant is unavailable. Because Goins offers no compelling reason to 
depart from that precedent, this Court should refuse to do so. 
1. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant 
has long been admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause. 
As to cross-examination, the Sixth Amendment guarantees only the 
opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination") (emphasis added). As this Court 
has long recognized, even where a defendant II may have elected to forgo 
cross-examination" that II does not mean that the opportunity was not 
available." State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986); see State v. Pecht, 
2002 UT 41, ,I39, 48 P.3d 931; State v. Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah 1977); see 
also Barger v. Oklahoma, 238 F. App' x. 343, 346-47 (10th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Williams, 116 F. App'x. 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2004); Simmons v. State, 234 
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. App. 2006); People v. Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061 
(Cal. 2008); People v. Yost, 749 N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. App. 2008); State v. 
Artis, 215 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo. App. 2007). 
-23-
Thus, the Sixth Amend1nent does not guarantee cross-examination 
will take place at all, let alone "cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." United 
States v. Owens 484 U.S. 554,559 (1988) (citations 01nitted); Pecht, 2002 UT 41, 
,I39; see also People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1126 (Cal. 2010) ("Nothing in 
Crauiford casts doubt on the continuing vitality of Owens."). Whether a prior 
opportunity is" adequate" depends on the facts of a case. 
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have long held 
that the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness may be 
admissible at trial.4 More than a century ago, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed this possibility in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
(1985). Mattox was convicted of a murder in Indian territory. Id.at 239. His 
conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was tried a second time, which 
4 The Supreme Court excluded the preliminary hearing testimony of 
an unavailable witness in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965). But the 
problems in Pointer-that Pointer lacked counsel at the preliminary hearing 
and the government made no attempt to procure the out-of-state witness-
are not present here. Other Supreme Court cases excluding preliminary 
hearing testimony on confrontation grounds have generally involved 
circumstances- also not present her·e-where the declarant was not truly 
unavailable. See id.; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (preliminary 
hearing testhnony inadmissible where State did not seek presence); Motes v. 
United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (witness unavailable due to negligence of 
government); see also State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) (preliminary 
hearing testimony inadmissible at trial where State had not proven 
unavailability). See Point IB, supra. 
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resulted in a hung jury. Id. at 251. By the time of his third trial, two of the 
witnesses against him had died. Id. at 240. The trial court permitted those 
witnesse·s' prior testimonies-in the form of reporter's notes-to be read at 
Mattox's third trial. Id. He was convicted and appealed, claiming that 
admission of this prior testimony violated his confrontation rights. Id . . 
In holding the testimony admissible, the Supreme Court noted that 
"the authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the 
defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before 
a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is 
overwhelming." Id. at 242 ( emphasis added). In support, the court favorably 
cited more than a dozen lower court cases, including one in which "the 
substance of a deceased witness' testimony given at a preliminary 
examination was held to be admissible." Id. (citing United States v. Macomb, 
5 McLean 286, Fed. Cas. No. 15,702). 
The court explained that the "primary object" of the confrontation 
clause was "to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used 
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal exa1nina tion and cross-examination 
of the witness," which was met by prior sworn testimony. Id. The court 
understood that its holding would "deprive[]" a defendant "of the 
advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the 
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law has designed for his protection," but noted that the general rule "must 
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities 
of the case," and that letting the guilty walk free. because their accusers were 
no longer available "would be carrying his constitutional protection to an 
unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may 
be preserved to the accused." Id. at 243. Thus, confrontation was satisfied 
"in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and 
subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination." Id. at 244 ( emphasis 
added). This was so even though the court upheld the exclusion of some 
impeachment evidence against a deceased witness that had been discovered 
after trial. Id. at 244-49. 
Mattox's holding has been reaffirmed for more than 100 years. 
Though its language was broad enough to include preliminary hearings, the 
Supreme Court first addressed preliminary hearings specifically nearly fifty 
years ago in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). 
In Green, a minor named Porter sold n1arijuana to an undercover 
officer. 399 U.S. at 151. After Porter was arrested, he named Green as his 
supplier. Id. Porter later testified for the State at Green's preliminary 
hearing, where he was cross-examined by defense counsel. Id. At trial, 
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Porter again testified, but became "markedly evasive and uncooperative," 
claiming that he had forgotten who his supplier was. Id. at 151-52 (citation 
and quotation omitted). The court admitted Porter's preliminary hearing 
testimony to impeach him. Id. at 152. The California Supreme Court held 
that admitting Porter's preliminary hearing testimony violated Green's 
confrontation rights. Id. at 153. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The court acknowledged 
that one virtue of having a witness testify at trial was that the jury could 
"observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement," which 
would aid "the jury in assessing his credibility." Id. at 158. But the court 
cautioned that this direct observation was not the be-all and end-all of the 
Confrontation Clause-while it "may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the h·uth of the prior statement if it could somehow be 
whisked magically back in time to witness" it, the Constitution did not 
require that. Id. at 160-61. 
Granted, Porter actually testified at Green's trial, and was subject to 
cross-exa1nination on his prior statements. Id. at 161-62. But the Court's 
holding was not limited to that circumstance-the Court explained that 
"Porter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible" under the 
Confrontation Clause even if Porter had not testified at trial, because his 
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preliminary hearing statement was "given under circumstances closely 
approximating those that surround a typical trial," which included: 
• Porter was under oath; 
• Green was represented by counsel; 
• Green's counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Porter on his statements to police, without any significant 
limitation; and 
• the proceedings were held in front of a judge. 
Id. at 165-66. Under these circumstances, the preliminary hearing was not 
"significantly different from an actual trial" for confrontation purposes, and 
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible even if 
Porter had been unavailable to testify at trial. Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. 
257). 
Green was decided before both Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and 
Crawford, which set out the current confrontation requirements. But both 
Roberts and Crawford show Green's continuing validity. 
Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen 
credit cards from a Bernard Isaacs. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. One of the 
witnesses for Roberts at the preliminary hearing was Anita Isaacs-
Bernard's daughter-who let Roberts stay at her apartment. Id. Anita 
denied giving Roberts permission to use her father's checks and credit 
cards. Id. At trial, Roberts claimed that Anita had given him the financial 
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instruments "with the understanding that he could use them." Id. at 59. 
Anita was not available to testify at trial, so the State introduced her 
preliminary hearing testimony to rebut Roberts' claim. Id. 
Like the California court in Green, the Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts 
held that prior preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause because there was "little incentive to cross-examine a 
witness at a preliminary hearing, where the ultimate issue is only probable 
cause." Id. at 61 (citation and quotation omitted). The Supreme Court 
reversed and re-affirmed Green., explaining that the preliminary hearing 
afforded an "adequate opportunity to cross-examine." Id. at 73 (citation 
omitted). 
True, the Roberts court also held that hearsay statements of an 
unavailable declarant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause so 
long as they bore "adequate indicia of reliability." Id. at 66 (quotation 
omitted). And the Supreme Court later abandoned this test in Crawford in 
favor of the two-element test of (1) unavailability and (2) prior opportunity 
for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 60. But Crawford itself noted that Roberts' 
result likely survived, even if its test did not. Id. at 58 ("Even our recent 
cases, in their outcomes, hew[ed] closely to the traditional line. [Roberts] 
admitted testhnony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had 
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cross-examined the witness."). And like Roberts, Cranford-re-affirmed Green 
and Mattox. Id. at 57 (citing Green and Mattox for proposition that 
"preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine"). Further, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), made clear that cross-
examination need not even necessarily take place-the defendant need only 
have the opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 559. 
This Court has repeatedly affirmed the admission of an unavailable 
witness's preliminary hearing testimony, most recently last year. Mackin v. 
State, 2016 UT 47, if if38-42, _ P.3d _; Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402-03; State v. 
Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913-14 (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 540-42 
(Utah 1981). In Brooks, four transients fought each other in the "hobo 
jungle" over $14. Brooks, 638 P.2d at 538. Two of the men were charged 
with aggravated assault, and the other two testified against them at a 
preliminary hearing, where they were cross-examined. Id. When the victims 
were later declared unavailable, their prior testimony came in at trial over 
Brooks' s confrontation objection. Id. 
This Court affirmed under the Roberts reliability test, which governed 
confrontati~n clause questions at the time, but explained that the reliability 
of the testimony sprang from a preliminary hearing, "with all its formalities 
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and protections." Id. at 540-41. And it rejected Brooks' s argument that 
preliminary hearings did not afford an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine based on the limited nature of the hearing, explaining that the 
defense's "motive and interest are the same" at both preliminary hearing 
and trial- to establish the defendant's im1ocence. Id. at 541. 
This Court also held prior preliminary hearing testimony admissible 
in both Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913-14, and Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which 
were decided under Roberts. And this Court most recently affirmed the 
admission of prior preliminary hearing testimony under Crawford in Mackin, 
2016 UT 47, ilif40-42. 
The court of appeals has followed suit. See State v. Pham, 2016 UT 
App 105, 372 P.3d 734, cert granted, 384 P.3d 567 (Sept. 12, 2016); West Valley 
City v. Kent, 2016 UT App 8, 366 P.3d 415; Garrido, 2013 UT App 245. This 
Court has approved this course. See Mackin, 2016 UT 47, if39 (holding that 
Garrido is "[c]onsistent" with Crawford and Menzies). And at least three 
federal circuits and seven other states have similarly held preliminary 
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness admissible under the 
confrontation clause. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 
2004); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1980); United States ex 
rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1981); People v. Williams, 
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181 P.3d 1035, 1061 (Cal.App.4th 2008); State v. Vinhaca, 205 P.3d 649 (Haw. 
2009); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308, 316-17 (Kan. 2004); State v. Aaron, 218 
S.W.3d 501, 517 (Mo. App. 2007); Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 479 (Nev. 
2009); State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 1005, 1011 (N.M. App. 2006); Primeaux v. 
State, 88 P.3d 893, 905-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004); see also United States v. 
Williams, 116 Fed.Appx. 890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding deposition 
testimony admissible under confrontation clause); Simmons v. State, 234 
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. App. 2006) (same); Yost, 749 N.W.2d at 774-75 (same). 
2. Goins has shown no compelling reason to depart from 
this long-established, and correct, precedent. 
Notwithstanding this extensive authority, Goins asks this Court to 
reverse a century-old course and hold that preliminary hearings-due to 
their limited purpose - are inadequate to afford a defendant the 
opportunity to cross-examine a witness. Pet.Br. 10-32. This Court should 
decline to do so. 
It is true that preliminary hearings take place early on in a case and 
are generally limited to determining whether probable cause exists. Id. It is 
also true that there is no right to confront witnesses at preliminary hearings, 
and that the State may choose to present written statements in lieu of live 
testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 1102; Timmerman, 2009 UT 58. But where the 
State elects to present live testimony, defendants do have a rule-based right 
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to cross-examine. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(l). And magistrates have anability-
albeit limited- to determine credibility. State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ,r24, 137 
P.3d 787 ("Magistrates may make credibility determinations in preliminary 
hearings, but the extent of those determinations is limited."). Where the 
prior opportunity to challenge credibility exists, confrontation is satisfied. 
See, e.g., State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931, 945 (Kan. 2007) (holding no 
confrontation violation from admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
where defendants are not barred from cross-examining witnesses at 
preliminary hearing on credibility); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 485 (similar). 
Further, however limited a particular preliminary hearing may be, the 
one here had those characteristics that the Green court held "closely 
approximat[ed] those that surround a typical trial" -Estrada was under 
oath; Goins was represented by counsel; defense counsel had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Estrada without limitation; and the 
proceedings were held in front of a judge. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ,r16. See 
Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66; see also Menzies, 889 P.2d 403 (holding preliminary 
hearing testimony reliable where it was "given under oath before a judge 
and Menzies was represented by counsel who had the opportunity to cross-
examine" the witness). 
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In arguing to the contrary, Goins relies largely on (1) the 1995 
amendment of Utah Constitution, article I, section 12; and (2) People v. Fry, 
92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). Neither is persuasive. 
After this Court decided Brooks, the Utah Constitution was amended 
to make clear that the purpose of preliminary hearings was to determine 
probable cause, and that reliable hearsay was admissible. See Pham, 2016 
UT App 105, if17 n.3. This overturned this Court's decision in State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), which held that there was a state 
constitutional right to cross-examine at preliminary hearings. 
But these changes did not affect the federal constitution nor the 
aspects of preliminary hearings that the United States Supreme Court has 
held ensure an adequate opportunity for cross-examination-a witness 
under oath, a judge, defense counsel, and cross-examining without 
significant limitation. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66. 
Goins also cites to People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). Pet.Br. 27-29. 
But Fry is unpersuasive. There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
because preliminary hearings in that state are limited to probable cause 
findings, they could not afford an adequate prior opportunity for cross-
examination. Id. at 977. But as shown, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected this very sort of reasoning as far back as Mattox and as recently as 
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Green. And, again, whatever the limits of preliminary hearings generally, 
the one here retained the characteristics that both the United States Supreme 
Court and this Court have held most critical-an oath, a judge, a witness 
able to be cross-examined without significant limitation, and a defendant 
represented by counsel. 
And, in Brooks, this Court explicitly rejected the very case on which 
Fry relied- People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1979). Fry cited Smith for the 
proposition that "due to the limited nature of the preliminary hearing, the 
opportun_ity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause." 92 P.3d at 977. Brooks directly rejected Smith's 
reasoning, holding that defense counsel's "motive and interest are the 
same" at both preliminary hearing and trial" and that "cross-examination 
takes place" at both "under the same motive and interest." 638 P.2d at 541. 
See also Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (" At the preliminary hearing and trial, 
Defendant was charged with the same crimes, he had the same defense 
counsel, and the same opportunity and motive to cross-examine" the 
witness); State v. Mohamed, 130 P.3d 401, 405 (Wash. App. 2006) 
("Mohamed's interest at the pretrial hearing was the same as it would have 
been at trial, and equally pressing: to establish [victim's] recantation as 
credible and prove that her out of court statements were umeliable."). As 
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the court of appeals noted here, the arguments rejected on this issue in 
Brooks were identical to those raised by Goins in the court of appeals. Goins, 
2016 UT App 57, ,r20. 
Further, other courts have almost universally rejected Fn/ s reasoning. 
Most of the courts addressing Fry have either distinguished it or outright 
declined to follow it. This is because Fry's extre1ne outcome results in "a 
blanket prohibition of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness" -which the "majority of courts do not condone." State v. Mantz, 
222 P.3d 471, 477 (Idaho App. 2009); see, e.g., People v. Thompson, case no. 
C058768, 2009 WL 4758792, *14 (Cal. App. 3d. Dec. 14, 2009) (refusing to 
follow Fry)(unpublished); State v. Nofoa, 349 P.3d 327, 339-40 (Haw. 2015) 
(refusin.g to follow Fry's "complete ban on prelhninary hearing" testimony 
in favor of reviewing each decision on" case-by-case basis"); Stano, 159 P.3d 
at 945 (refusing to follow Fry where defendants can cross-examine state 
witnesses at preliminary hearings and have similar motives to trial); State v. 
Aaron, 218 S.W.3d 501, 516 (Mo. App. 2007) (refusing to follow Fry despite 
defendant's admittedly different "interest and motive in his cross-
examination" at preliminary hearing); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 484-85 (refusing to 
follow Fry); Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (refusing to follow Fry and holding 
that counsel had same motive and interest both at preliminary hearing and 
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at trial); Mohamed, 130 P.3d at 402, 404-05 (refusing to follow Fry because 
defendant had similar motive and prior opportunity to cross-examine); see 
also O'Neal v. Province, 415 Fed.Appx. 921, 923-24 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
lower court because preliminary hearing afforded sufficient opportunity for 
prior cross-examination); Parker v. Jones, 423 Fed.Appx. 824, 831-32 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Hargrove, 382 Fed.Appx. 765, 779 (10th Cir. 
2010) (affirming lower court even "if defendant's cross-examination of 
witness at the preliminary hearing was narrow in scope and would have 
been conducted differently" if counsel knew the witness would be 
unavailable at trial); Bowman v. Neal, 172 Fed.Appx. 819, 828-29 (10th Cir. 
2006) (affirming lower court's admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
even when limitations were placed on defense counsel's prior cross-
examination). 
Goins seeks to support his position by citing to State v. Stuart, 695 
N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005). Pet.Br. 25. But Stuart did not support establishment 
of a per se ban on using preliminary hearing testimony. It merely stated that 
when a cross-examination is in fact restricted on credibility issues, a 
confrontation problem could arise if the prosecution later tried to use that 
testimony at trial. Id.at 266. That is not this case. Whatever potential 
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limitations may be imposed by individual 1nagistrates in a given case, none 
occurred here. 
Goins also presses a number of policy arguments, none of them 
persuasive. He alleges that if defense counsel were required to fully cross-
examine at prelhninary hearings, "there may be little time left for judges to 
conduct actual trials." Pet.Br. 29. He supports his assertion of procedural 
mayhem by providing a compilation of felonies for which preliminary 
hearings were scheduled in 2015. Pet. Br. at separately bound Appendix. He 
then proceeds to provide his "best guess" and "conjecture" as to the 
amount, in hours, of judicial time that would be dedicated to preliminary 
hearings in which defense counsel took full advantage of the opportunity to 
cross-examine every witness. Id. at 29-30. His compilation does not account 
for a number of relevant factors- e.g., the number of preliminary hearings 
waived in 2015 or already including cross-examination of all key 
witnesses- and fails to consider the number of cases in which "every" 
witness would truly need to be cross-examined. Id. Goins acknowledges 
and excuses the potential inaccuracies in both the data and the estimates, 
using the information simply to demonstrate the hnpracticality of cross-
examining every witness in every preliminary hearing. Id. at 30. 
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But, practically speaking, not every defense counsel would choose to 
cross-examine every witness: they simply have the opportunity to do so. 
And there remain witnesses for whon1 cross-examination should always 
occur, e.g., those who are homeless, terminally ill, seriously mentally ill, 
suicidal, drug-addicted, and active-duty military subject to combat 
deployment. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ,I18, n7. The fact remains, the 
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness has been 
admissible at trial in Utah since Maddox, Green, or at very least, Brooks. The 
intervening decades have not created unmanageable caseloads. 
Goins' remaining concerns present no barrier to use of the 
preliminary hearing testimony in appropriate circumstances. It has long 
been certain that such testimony could be admissible if the declarant was 
unavailable and the defendant had counsel and was able to cross-examine 
the witness. To the extent a magistrate in another case might limit cross-
examination, Pet.Br. 25-27, that did not happen here. In any event, an effort 
by a magistrate to significantly limit cross-examination on credibility issues, 
or by the State to present reliable hearsay in lieu of live testimony, see Utah 
R. Evid. 1102, would present this Court with a much different case and 
defense counsel with a 1nuch stronger argument for exclusion of the 
testimony from trial. 
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Further, a defense counsel's decision to curtail potentially beneficial 
avenues of questioning for whatever reason, Pet.Br. 25, does not eliminate 
the opportunity to cross-examine. See Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ,r,r1s, 20 
(Garrido's Sixth Amendment rights not violated by adn1ission of victim's 
preliminary hearing testimony at trial because Garrido had requisite 
opportunity for cross-examination at preliminary hearing, despite counsel's 
decision to forego it). 
Goins also asserts that later-discovered evidence often impacts cross-
examination at trial, and that a preliminary hearing conducted before all 
discovery is availab_le to the defense necessarily renders the prior 
opportunity inadequate. Pet.Br. 31. But this Court rejected that very 
contention in Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which Goins does not even cite. 
Menzies's former cell mate, Walter Britton, testified at Menzies's 
preliminary hearing that Menzies confessed to killing the victim. Id. at 401. 
At trial, Britton became uncooperative and refused to testify, despite the 
court holding him in contempt. Id. The trial court ruled Britton unavailable 
and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony. Id. at 401-02. 
On appeal, Menzies argued a confrontation violation, based in part on 
his inability to cross-examine Britton using convictions that occurred 
between preliminary hearing and h·ial. Id. at 403. This Court affirmed, 
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explaining that while it "agree[ d] that new evidence obtained after the 
hearing may have aided an attack on Brittan's credibility on cross-
examination, the preliminary hearing transcript indicate[d] that the issue 
was well-explored." Id. 
Goins argues for the first time that application of Utah Constitution, 
Art. I, section 12 and rule 804(a)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence, violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution and the Uniform 
Operation of Laws provision of the state constitution. Pet.Br. 26-27. But in 
the absence of any mention of exceptions to the preservation rule, this Court 
should decline to entertain the claim. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 113, 95 
P.3d 276 (This Court generally "will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial 
court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances"). 5 
Goins's arguments ignore the fact that it is Goins-not the State-
who seeks_ to change the law. He has not met his heavy burden of 
convincing this Court that a long line of authority sh·etching back more than 
5 Alternatively, the issue fails for inadequate briefing because Goins 
does not include any meaningful analysis, as required by rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (outline the 
requirements of an adequate brief); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ,r22, 128 P.3d 
1179. 
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a century- and approved by this Court as recently as last October- has 
become unworkable or was incorrectly decided in the first instance. See 
generally Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398-99. Preliminary hearing testimony of an 
unavailable declarant should remain generally admissible absent 
exceptional circumstances, such as where a magish·ate significantly limits 
cross-examination on credibility issues. 
Finally, there is an important policy reason to reject Goins's blanket 
approach. In fairness to the State and victims, a defendant should not walk 
free merely because a victim has become unavailable after being cross-
examined at a preliminary hearing. As the Mattox court explained, "To say 
that a criminal ... should go scot free simply because death has closed the 
mouth of" the victim "would be carrying his constitutional protection to an 
unwarrantable extent. The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order than an incidental benefit may 
be preserved to the accused." 156 U.S. at 243. 
Those "incidental benefits" included "testing the recollection and 
sifting the conscience of the witness" and "compelling him to stand face to 
face with the jury in order that they may look at hhn, and judge his 
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief." Id. at 242-43. Cf Green, 399 U.S. at 160 
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(rejecting confrontation claim based on admission of preliminary hearing 
testimony even though it "may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statements if it could somehow be 
whisked magically back in time to witness a grueling cross-examination" at 
the time of the statement). 
Thus, the Supreme Court has struck a necessary balance and explicitly 
recognized the need to consider fairness not only to a defendant, but to the 
State and to victims. Fairness concerns are particularly acute in domestic 
violence and gang cases, where it is lamentably common for victims to 
become uncooperative-and thus unavailable-out of fear of the defendant, 
a misplaced sense of love or loyalty, or some other factor outside the State's 
control. See, e.g., Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ,r,r4, 23-26 (discussing domestic 
violence victim's lack of cooperation with prosecution stemming from fear). 
Those same concerns support rejection of Goins's assertion of a blanket 
prohibition on the use at trial of an unavailable witness's preliminary 
hearing testimony. 
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3. Admitting the unavailable victim's cross-examined 
preliminary hearing testimony did not violate Goins' s 
confrontation right. 
Applying the long-established precedent previously described to this 
case, this Court should hold that Goins has not shown a violation of his 
confrontation right. 
Goins points to no defect in or limitation of the cross-examination that 
took place at preliminary hearing. His cross-examination of the witness- a 
known transient-was entirely unfettered. Though he suggests that 
discovery was not complete at the time of the preliminary hearing, Pet. Br. 
22-23, he does not point to any evidence that later came to his attention that 
he would have used had the victim appeared at trial. Thus, Goins has not 
shown that the preliminary hearing in his case did not afford him an 
adequate opportunity to cross-exa1nine the victim, and this Court should 
affirm. 
D. Any error in the court of appeals' decision concerning use of 
Estrada's preliminary hearing testimony at trial would be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Should this Court find that the use at h·ial of Estrada's preliminary 
hearing testimony violated Goins' s confrontation rights, it should still 
affirm his felony conviction because the error would be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
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Goins urges reversal because Estrada's testimony was "vital" to the 
State's case on both his felony and misdemeanor convictions. Pet.Br. 17-18. 
Instead, any error would be prejudicial only as to Goins' class A 
misdemeanor conviction for using a knife against Estrada. See Goins, 2016 
UT App 57, ,r 6, n5. His was the only testimony offered with regard to the 
misdemeanor charge, R167:5-6, requiring reversal if it were found to have 
been erroneously admitted. 
Estrada's testimony was not relevant to the felonious assault on 
Omar. His comments about Goins' possession of the knife and Goins' 
attitude before finding Omar would have had little, if any, impact on the 
conviction for assaulting Omar because: (1) Estrada did not witness the 
assault; (2) Omar's vivid testimony was independently corroborated by an 
eyewitness who watched almost the entirety of the altercation; and (3) 
further corroboration derived from photographs depicting the significant 
injuries inflicted on Omar and the minor scratches suffered by Goins. See id. 
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II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DENIED GOINS'S 
REHEARING PETITION BASED ON RULE 35 AND 
PRECEDENT FROM THIS COURT; REGARDLESS, THE 
CLAIMS DO NOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF GO INS'S PRIOR COUNSEL 
Goins claims that the court of appeals erroneously denied his 
rehearing petition in which, with the benefit of new appellate counsel, he 
raised new claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 6 
Pet.Br. 33-39. He contends that the clahns warranted consideration on 
rehearing under rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, because prior 
appellate counsel's failure to raise the claims caused the court of appeals to 
11 overlook" them. Id. at 33-35. He further argues that the court should have 
reached the merits of the claims because they could be reviewed and 
decided on the existing appellate record. Id. at 34. 
But a rehearing petition is not an appropriate vehicle for raising 
claims for the first time on direct appeal. To permit Goins to do so would 
exceed the scope of the rule's plain language and conflict with the long-
standing decisions of this Court. 
6 Goins appropriately limits this issue to the charges relating to Omar. 
Pet.Br. 32. 
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A. The court of appeals properly refused to hear a new claim 
raised for the first time in a rehearing petition. 
Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a petition 
for rehearing "shall state with particularity the points of law or fact ·which 
the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended" in 
rendering its decision in a direct appeal. Utah R. App. P. 35(a). 
Goins contends that he properly presented his new ineffectiveness 
claims in a rehearing petition because his original appellate counsel's failure 
to raise the claims in the direct appeal caused the court of appeals to 
"overlook" the clahns. Pet.Br. 37. By this reasoning, a rehearing petition 
would be an appropriate means to raise any claim not presented to the court 
of appeals in the first instance. 
The court of appeals properly rejected Goins's untimely attempt to 
include new claims in his appeal for several reasons. First, review of 
Goins's claims is outside the scope of rehearing proceedings. The plain 
language of the rule expressly permits rehearing in cases where the Court 
"has overlooked or misapprehended" points of law or fact in rendering its 
decision. Utah R. App. P. 35(a). This language focuses on the integrity and 
consistency of this Court's decisions on the issues before it when it wrote 
those decisions: a court cannot overlook or misapprehend a matter that was 
never presented to it. Thus, denial of the rehearing petition was in keeping 
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with the court of appeals' deference to this Court's rule-making authority. 
See, e.g., State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118, 1122 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing 
supreme court's authority for drafting appellate rules and refusing to adopt 
interpretation of appellate rule that exceeded the rule's plain language). 
Second, the court of appeals' denial of the petition is consistent with 
long-standing decisions from this Court holding that the rule does not 
provide a vehicle for presentation of new claims. See Nebeker v. Summit 
County, 2014 UT App 244, if 60, 338 P.3d 203 (refusing to consider challenge 
raised for first time in rehearing petition); Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 
678, 681 (Utah 1982) (denying rehearing of new theory presented in 
rehearing petition); Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 P. 832, 837-38 
(1924) (refusing to consider new issue in rehearing petition that appellant 
did not previously raise); Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498, 170 P. 774, 778 
(1918) (same); Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) (rehearing 
will not be granted unless the court failed to consider some material point, 
erred in its conclusions, or is presented with a material discovery which was 
unknown when the case was argued). Cf Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, if 63 n.16, 
_ P.3d _ (refusing to consider new argument raised in 24G) letter). 
Third, none of Goins' s policy arguments justifies an exception to the 
rule. Despite his statements to the contrary, Goins's new claims are neither 
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"timely" nor "ripe." Pet.Br. 36-37. His new claims are not "thnely" raised if 
they may not, by rule, be raised in a rehearing petition. The fact that the 
petition itself was timely-filed provides no justification for review of matters 
outside the scope of rule 35. 
Goins's belief that his claims are "still ripe" overlooks the fact that 
they will remain "ripe" when pursued by the "more familiar method" for 
reviewing such claims: post-conviction review under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act ["PCRA"]. See Order (citing Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, 279 
P.3d 396, and Landry v. State, 2012 UT App 350, 293 P.3d 1092). The PCRA 
expressly provides that "a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that 
the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the 
failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel." 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106(3) (West Supp. 2015). This exception would 
allow Goins to avoid the procedural bar of the PCRA and obtain post-
conviction review of his new claims by demonstrating his claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, if 45, 
293 P.3d 345. The fact that Goins would have to hire counsel, proceed prose, 
or seek counsel willing to present his case pro bona is not unique to Goins 
but is of concern to every defendant pursuing this method of review. 
Goins' s appeal to fairness, judicial economy and efficiency does not 
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bring his claims within the procedural framework by which this Court has 
decided such matters may be pursued. Pet.Br. 37. Especially where, as here, 
the claims lack merit, it is hard to see that either justice or judicial economy 
will be served by dictating that the court of appeals should have ignored 
rule 35 and granted review of the claims on rehearing. 
Further, there is no fair comparison of Goins's attempt to present a 
new, untimely ineffectiveness claim with use of a rule 23B remand to 
present a timely ineffectiveness claim: the latter is expressly provided for by 
appellate rule while the former is not. Pet. Br. 38-39. 
Finally, this Court's decision in State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 
(Utah 1991), does not establish error in the court of appeals' denial of 
Goins' s rehearing petition. Pet. Br. 38. Humphries involved this Court's 
decision to provide discretionary review of a new claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel in the context of a petition for writ of 
certiorari. 818 P.2d at 1029. It did not speak to the court of appeals' exercise 
of its discretionary review under rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
In any event, rule 35 does not provide for presentation and review 
new claims, and the court of appeals did not err in so interpreting the rule 
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in this case. As there was no error in the denial of the rehearing petition, 
further review unnecessary. 
B. This Court should refuse to review the new claim on certiorari. 
Should this Court accept Goins' s invitation to reach the merits of his 
new claims for the first time on certiorari review, there is ·precedent to do so. 
See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991), abrogated on other grounds 
in State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92. In Humphries, this Court 
granted certiorari to review a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct and 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the 
error. Id. at 1028-30. The Court held that review was appropriate because 
the new claims were "raised in a second tier of appellate review by new 
appellate counsel," and the record and briefs included all evidence and 
argument which might be made on the matter. Id. at 1029. 
This Court may, in its discretion, undertake such a review. See Utah 
R. App. P. 46(a). But it should not do so because this case is distinguishable 
from Humphries and is not entitled to the same consideration. In Humphries, 
the State candidly acknowledged the existence of reversible error that the 
State was willing to concede in a post-conviction proceeding, justifying 
circumvention of the usual procedure for remedying the new claim. 818 
P.2d at 1029. Here, there is no reversible error (see argument, infra), and the 
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procedure for addressing Goins' s new claims should be no different ·than 
the established procedure applied to all other claims raised following 
issuance of a decision on direct appeal. 
C. In any event, Goins's new claims do not establish ineffective 
assistance. 
In the end, this Court's review is unwarranted because trial counsel's 
performance was not deficient, and if it was, it was not prejudicial and, 
hence, would not have resulted in reversal had appellate counsel raised the 
claim on appeal. See Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, if211, 344 P.3d 581 
(ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for not raising a claim requires proof of 
"a genuine issue of material fact" regarding whether appellate counsel 
overlooked an issue which is obvious from the h 4 ial record and ... which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal"). 
Ineffective assistance requires a defendant to prove both (1) deficient 
performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
694 (1984). Proving the deficient performance element requires a defendant 
to overcome the "strong presumption" that counsel acted reasonably. Id. at 
689. This presumption is overcome only where a defendant can show that 
no reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did. See, e.g., State v. 
Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, if35, 317 P.3d 968 (holding no deficient 
performance for not introd1:-7-cing evidence where record did not show that 
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"no reasonable attorney would have failed to introduce it into evidence"). 
Further, deficient performance must be II a demonstrable reality," not a 
"speculative matter." State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, iJ30, 253 P.3d 1082. This 
Court must II presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware, and 
any inadequacies, "ambiguities, or deficiencies" in the record regarding 
counsel's performance are "simply ... construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, iJ17. 
The challenged jury instruction was proffered by defense counsel 
below and provided: 
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a 
defendant to establish self-defense by a preponderance or 
greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the 
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-
defense. If the defendant has done this, and if such evidence of self-
defense, when considered in connection with all other evidence 
in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt 
then you must find him not guilty. 
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is 
entitled to an acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence from 
either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
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R102 (emphasis added) (in Addendum D) Oury instr. 24).7 Goins argues 
that the instruction erroneously informs the jury that he is "solely" 
responsible to "bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-
defense." Pet.Br. 41, 43-44. He explains that the case law instead permits 
either party to present such evidence. Id. at 40-42. This error, he claims, 
permitted the jury to determine that because the State, not Goins, brought 
forward the evidence showing self-defense "in the first instance," the 
affirmative defense was inapplicable. Id. at 42-43. 
The instruction accurately sets out the parties' respective burdens of 
proof relative to the affirmative defense except in one sentence which 
requires defendant to bring forward smne supporting evidence. R102. 
Goins correctly observes that the initial evidence triggering a self-defense 
claim may come from either party. See State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 934 
(Utah App. 1991) (addressing similarly-worded instruction, noting the 
evidence may be "introduced by defense or prosecution"), overruled on other 
grounds in State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). This fact alone, 
however, does not establish that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 
7 Goins inadvertently recites his own proposed jury insh4 uction 
instead of the instruction given by the trial court and thereafter states that 
the trial court used that instruction. Pet.Br. 29, 41. The trial court altered 
the proposed instruction by eliminating part of it and thereafter used the 
altered instruction. Compare R60 with R102. 
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Review begins with the "strong presumption" that counsel acted 
reasonably. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To defeat the presumption, Goins 
must show that no reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did. 
See, e.g., Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, if 35. He cannot do so on this record. 
When counsel submitted the instruction, trial was approaching, 
counsel had identified the potential witnesses, and she had every reason to 
fully anticipate offering evidence on which to pursue the planned 
affirmative defense. R35-70. She clearly knew that self-defense evidence 
was a prerequisite to advancing the planned defense, and she knew that she 
needed to paint Omar as the aggressor at the beginning of his interaction 
with Goins, show that Omar put Goins in a position where the only means 
of self-defense he had was to bite Omar, then elaborate not only on Omar's 
combative state of mind but on his escalated impulse to "make Desean 
bleed, too." R202:27-30; R168:41-44. Having been through the preliminary 
hearing and seen a snapshot of the State's case, defense counsel's 
anticipation of the need to introduce, elaborate on, or highlight the evidence 
necessary for the self-defense claim would be entirely reasonable. Where 
counsel reasonably expected to adduce at least some of the necessary 
evidence at trial, her inclusion of the challenged sentence in her proposed 
jury instruction was not umeasonable. Counsel thereafter produced such 
-55-
evidence at trial, reasonably refusing to rest on the prosecutor's direct 
examination of the witnesses. Counsel's actions are entirely reasonable, 
and, under these circumstances, it cannot be said that no reasonable 
attorney would have included the challenged sentence in the jury 
instruction. 
Even when instructions are "ilnproper, confusing, or have the 
potential to mislead the jury," the defendant claiming ineffective assistance 
1nust still show prejudice- a reasonable likelihood of a different result 
absent the error. State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ~42, 355 P.3d 1031. Goins' s 
ineffectiveness claims fail because he fails to present a prejudice argument. 
He shnply restates the standards for establishing prejudice for his trial and 
appellate claims, but presents no analysis regarding why, absent his trial 
counsel's actions, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result. 
Pet.Br. 46-47. See Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ~152. 
In any case, Goins cannot make this showing because the challenged 
sentence in jury instruction 24 was not prejudicial where Goins actually 
adduced vital parts of the self-defense evidence. See id. at 934-35. See also 
Haston, 811 P.2d at 934 (finding similarly-worded instruction harmless 
because Haston adduced part of the affirmative defense evidence). 
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The jury was told that Goins needed to "bring forward some evidence 
which tends to show self-defense.'! R102. They were not instructed that he 
was "solely" responsible for adducing such evidence or that he needed to 
"bring forward" the evidence "in the first instance," as Goins claims. 
Pet.Br. 41, 43-44. Neither were they told that Goins had any burden to 
establish that the evidence proved self-defense. R102. 
Goins did exactly as the instruction purported to require- adduced 
evidence tending to show self-defense. For example, the State called Omar 
as its first witness and established that he was the first to 1nake physical 
contact when he pushed Goins for stepping on his blanket and that he 
thereafter sought to hurt Goins when he saw his own blood after losing his 
earlobe. R167:125-31. 
Defense counsel added to this evidence in cross and re-cross 
examination of Omar, introducing Omar's preliminary hearing testimony 
and defense-favorable phraseology. See, e.g., R167:143 (Omar's prior 
testimony that he was already "pissed" at Goins before he touched the 
blanket);_ R167:140-41 (Omar's prior admission that when he saw his own 
blood, he "went crazy again," wanting "to try to make things even" and "to 
make [Goins] bleed, too"); R167:140-45 (On1ar' s prior explanation that he 
not only tried to make Goins bleed, but then chased him while trying to 
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punch him). The misstatement in instruction 24 is unlikely to prompt the 
jury to ignore defense counsel's efforts and reject his self-defense claim 
either because Goins did not "bring forward s01ne evidence" of self-defense 
or because he did not do so before the State did. See Haston, 811 P.2d at 934. 
Neither is the 1nisstate1nent · likely to have affected the jury's 
perception of the ultimate burden of proof. See Pet.Br. 43 (stating the 
instruction gave the State a "free pass in its burden to prove the defendant 
guilty"). This Court views the instructions as a whole to determine if they 
"fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case," and can affirm 
even where "one of the instructions, standing alone is not as accurate as it 
might have been." State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235, ,r1s, 359 P.3d 1272 
( quotation, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Haston, 
811 P.2d at 934. 
Here, instruction 24 expressly and accurately stated that Goins was 
not required to establish self-defense "by a preponderance or greater weight 
of the evidence." R102. The same instruction also explained that the jury 
must acquit Goins if there was "any basis in the evidence from either side 
sufficient to cre~te a reasonable doubt." Id. Instruction 25 expressly stated 
that it was "the prosecution's burden to prove that the defendant did not act 
in self-defense" and that it must do so "beyond a reasonable doubt" R103. 
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Q 
Each of the relevant elements instructions also directed that the State must 
prove all elements, including that "Goins did not act in self-defense," 
beyond a reasonable doubt. R91, 92, 97 Oury instr. 13, 14, 19). And both 
parties correctly argued in closing that the State bore the burden of proving 
· that Goins did not act in self-defense. R168:33-34, 43-44. 
Under these circumstances, Goins cannot establish the requisite 
prejudice for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective - a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result absent the misstate1nent in instruction 24. See 
Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ~42 (even when instructions are "improper, confusing, 
or have the potential to mislead the jury," a defendant claiming ineffective 
assistance must still show prejudice). Therefore, his claim that appellate 
counsel was ineffective necessarily fails. See Menzies, 2014 UT 40., if211 
(appellate counsel is ineffective for not raising a claim only if "a genuine 
issue of material fact" exists regarding whether appellate counsel 
overlooked an issue which is obvious from the trial record and ... which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal"). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and its denial of Goins's rehearing petition. 
Respectfully submitted on January 6, 2017. 
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ORME, Judge: 
1. Judge James Z. Davis began his work on this case as a member 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court, but 
thereafter became a Senior Judge. He completed his work on this 
case sitting by special assignment as authorized by law. See 
generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(6). Judge Davis, a member 
of this court from 1993 until late in 2015 when he became a 
senior judge, passed away on February 27, 2016. Judge Davis 
was twice our presiding judge and three times our 
representative on the Judicial Council. More importantly, he was 
an esteemed colleague and good friend. His wit, wisdom, and 
dedication will be sorely missed. 
State v. Goins 
Cjfl Desean Michael Goins (Defendant) was convicted of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, see Utah Code Arm. 
§ 76-5-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015), and threatening with or 
using a dangerous weapon in a fight, a class A misdemeanor, see 
id. § 76-10-506.2 Defendant now appeals both convictions, 
arguing that the trial court erroneously found that a witness was 
unavailable and allowed the witness's prior testimony to be used 
against Defendant on that basis. Because there was no error in 
the trial court's determination of unavailability, and because 
Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness 
when he gave his prior testimony, we affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Cjf2 One morning in July 2013, Defendant and his girlfriend 
set off on a search in downtown Salt Lake City with a very 
specific goal: to find a homeless man (Witness) whom Defendant 
believed had stolen his cell phone. They found Wih1ess outside a 
homeless shelter for men. With knife in hand, Defendant 
confronted Witness, who denied taking the phone and hurried 
away. 
13 The couple then made their way to Pioneer Park, a 
traditional haunt of Salt Lake's homeless denizens, where one of 
Witness's friends (Victim), also a homeless man, was sleeping on 
his blanket. Defendant's girlfriend woke Victim and asked if he 
had seen Witness. Defendant, waving the knife he still carried, 
complained that Witness had stolen his phone. When Defendant 
2. Although some of the statutes cited in this opinion have been 
amended since July 2013, when the incident giving rise to the 
charges against Defendant occurred, the amendments do not 
affect our analysis. Accordingly, for ease of reference we cite the 
most recent codification of the statutes. 
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encroached on Victim's personal space, Victim pushed 
Defendant off the blanket. An altercation ensued, during which 
Defendant bit off Victim's earlobe. Both men stood up and 
squared off once again, and Defendant then retrieved his knife, 
which he had dropped during the scuffle, and stabbed Victim 
under the left arm. Soon thereafter, police arrived and arrested 
Defendant. Defendant was later charged in connection with the 
assault of Victim and the brandishing of the knife against 
Witness.3 
14 Prior to the preliminary hearing, the prosecution asked 
Salt Lake City police bike patrols to locate Victim and Witness. 
The officers were able to locate both men, who spent much of 
their time together, "based primarily on a description of 
[Victim's] missing earlobe," even though they did not have a 
description of Wih1ess. Victim and Witness arrived together at 
the preliminary hearing with a pastor from a church both men 
regularly visited. The prosecution seized the opportunity to keep 
more regular contact with both men through the pastor, 4 a man 
who had the trust of both Witness and Victim. 
3. Defendant was also charged with-and acquitted of-the 
felony of mayhem, nearly forgotten outside the confines of first-
year Criminal Law in law school. See Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-105 
(LexisNexis 2012) ("Every person who unlawfully and 
intentionally deprives a human being of a member of his body, 
or disables or renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the 
tongue, puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of 
mayhem."). Despite the rarity of mayhem convictions in modern 
times, they are not unheard of. See, e.g., State v. Fairclough, 44 
P.2d 692, 692-93 (Utah 1935) (affirming conviction for mayhem). 
4. By the time of the trial, the pastor had left the state for a new 
position. Because both the pastor and his successor affirmed that 
service was made on both Witness and Victim, and because the 
(continued ... ) 
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15 The prosecution regularly followed up with the pastor 
and emailed him the trial information for him to pass along to 
Wih1ess and Victim. The pastor verified that the two men 
received the notification. A few weeks before trial, the pastor 
informed the prosecution that Witness had gotten into some 
trouble, been jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving 
this information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Witness 
had already been released. From that time forth, neither Victim 
nor the pastor, both of whom knew Witness well and could 
recognize him by sight, saw or heard from Witness, and no one 
saw Witness with his former friends or in his former hang-outs. 
On the eve of trial, the prosecution contacted the jail to see if 
Witness was incarcerated again, but he was not. 
<j[6 Trial was scheduled to begin on October 23, 2013, but was 
continued one day because no jury had been called for that date. 
At that time, the prosecution asked the trial court to declare 
Witness unavailable because Witness did not appear for trial and 
the prosecution was unable to locate him. The prosecution also 
asked the trial court to admit Witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony during the trial. Over an objection raised by 
Defendant's counsel that Witness "was not 'unavailable,"' the 
trial court granted the motion and indicated that it would allow 
the preliminary hearing testimony at the rescheduled trial. At 
trial, which began the following day, the jury convicted 
Defendant of aggravated assault, for the attack on Victim, and of 
threatening with a dangerous weapon during a fight, for his 
confrontation of Witness. Defendant appeals, and we affirm. 5 
( ... continued) 
prosecution utilized the second pastor in the same manner as the 
first, we use "the pastor" when referring to either of the two 
pastors. 
5. Although Defendant apparently appeals both the conviction 
related to the assault of Victim and the one for brandishing the 
(continued ... ) 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
17 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding 
Wih1ess to be unavailable under rule 804 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and in permitting Witness's preliminary hearing 
testimony to be admitted under that rule as prior testimony. 
"We review the district court's evidentiary rulings under an 
abuse of discretion standard. However, error in the district 
court's evidentiary rulings will result in reversal only if the error 
is harmful." Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Commc'ns Corp., 2015 UT 
App 134, 'Il 17, 351 P.3d 832 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). "The district court's decision to admit testimony 
that may implicate the confrontation clause is also a question of 
law reviewed for correctness." State v. Poole, 2010 UT 25, 'Il 8, 232 
P.3d 519. 
ANALYSIS 
<JIB We note, preliminarily, that a statement is hearsay if 
(1) the witness made the statement outside of the current trial or 
hearing and (2) a party offers the statement "to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted in the statement." Utah R. Evid. 801(c)(l)-
(2). Hearsay is inadmissible, unless an exception applies. See id. 
R. 802. It is the interpretation and application of one such 
( ... continued) 
knife against Witness, we agree with the State that Witness's 
testimony was relevant only to the charge relating to Witness. 
Witness was not a witness to the assault of Victim and offered no 
testimony on that point at the preliminary hearing; therefore, 
even were we to discern an error in the presentation of Witness's 
preliminary hearing testimony to the jury-which we do not, see 
infra 'Ili 12-15, 18-20-we would still affirm Defendant's assault 
conviction because the alleged error would be harmless as to 
that charge. 
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exception-the admission of prior testimony by an unavailable 
potential witness-that we address in this opinion. See id. R. 
804(b)(l). 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding That 
Wih1ess Was Unavailable. 
CJ[9 Utah law requires that the party offering evidence in the 
form of witness testimony make reasonable efforts to procure the 
witness's testimony at trial. Id. R. 804(a)(5). "[C]onstitutional 
unavailability is found only when it is 'practically impossible to 
produce the witness in court.' ... [E]very reasonable effort must 
be made to produce the witness. 11 State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
402 (Utah 1994) ( citations omitted). 
110 But "[a] good faith search does not mean that every lead, 
no matter how nebulous, must be tracked to the ends of the 
earth." Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1974) 
( determining that the prosecution was under no obligation to 
investigate vague claims that one prosecution witness had 
11moved to somewhere in the state of New York" and that 
another "was said to have applied for employment with the 
Santa Fe Railway in the 'midwest"'). In essence, although a party 
must make every reasonable effort to procure the in-court 
testimony of the witnesses that the party wishes to use, the party 
is not, as the State puts it, required to do "everything humanly 
possible" to do so. Thus, "Rule 804(a)(S) does not require a 
patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential 
witness ... whose physical location and address are completely 
unknown." Brown. v. Harry Heathman, Inc., 744 P.2d 1016, 1018 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645-46 
(Utah 1995) (holding that State's efforts to locate witness were 
reasonable where it contacted United States Marshal's Office, 
which had an outstanding warrant for arrest of witness, and 
where federal officials "could not provide any concrete 
information as to his present location, other than that he might 
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be found in Mexico or southern California"), abrogated by statute 
on. other grounds as recognized by Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, 
1 70, 267 P.3d 232. 
111 In State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we 
concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to obtain two wih1esses' 
testimony were reasonable. In that case, the prosecution 
subpoenaed the wih1esses three times before trial; spoke with 
and was assured of the presence of one witness at trial by that 
witness's mother; visited the last known address of the other 
witness, but discovered that the wih1ess had moved without 
leaving a forwarding address; questioned police informants; and 
searched police files for evidence of the whereabouts of the 
missing witness. Id. at 893. Under such circumstances, we held 
that the prosecution's "efforts compl[ied] with the hearsay 
exception unavailability requirements." Id. On the other hand, in 
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded that the prosecutor's efforts to locate a witness 
were unreasonable and the witness was not unavailable "where 
efforts to secure the witness's attendance [were] cursory, where 
the party had clear indications that the witness would not attend 
or where the party had obvious means of obtaining those 
indications but neglected to do so." Id. at 1122. See also id. at 
1124-25 (affirming the district court, nonetheless, because the 
district court's improper admission of the testimony was 
harmless error). 
112 The instant case is much more like the events in Drawn 
than those discussed in Chapman. As in Drawn, but unlike in 
Chapman, the prosecution in this case went to considerable effort 
to obtain Witness's testimony at trial. Prior to the preliminary 
hearing, the prosecution sent out police bike patrols to locate 
Victim and Witness, and the officers located both men, even 
though they were part of Salt Lake City's large homeless 
population, based mostly on Victim's unfortunate lack of one 
earlobe. There was nothing as distinctive in Wih1ess's 
appearance, but luckily for the prosecution, Witness was often in 
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the company of Victim. The two were homeless, presenting 
obvious challenges to staying in touch, but when Victim and 
Witness arrived together at the preliminary hearing with the 
pastor, whom both men trusted, the prosecution seized upon the 
opporhmity to use the pastor as a vehicle for staying in more 
regular contact with both men. The prosecution followed up 
regularly with the pastor and emailed him Defendant's trial 
information. And the pastor verified that the two men 
personally received this notification. 
<j{13 A few weeks before trial, however, the pastor informed 
the prosecution that Witness had gotten in some trouble, been 
jailed, and fallen out with Victim. After receiving this 
information, the prosecutor contacted the jail, but Wib1ess had 
already been released. From that time forward, neither Victim 
nor the pastor saw or heard from Witness, and Witness was no 
longer found with his former friends or in his former haunts. It is 
far from clear that he even remained in Utah.6 Thus, although 
the prosecution did not re-enlist the police bike patrols to locate 
Witness, it did not need to. It had no idea where to send the 
6. Research shows that not only are homeless people 
more mobile than the population at large but that a 
significant percentage of homeless individuals engage in 
interstate migration, Peter H. Rossi, Down and Out in 
America: The Origins of Homelessness 126 (The University of 
Chicago Press 1989). See also Jennifer Amanda Jones, 
Problems Migrate: Lessons from San Francisco's Homeless Population 
Survey, Nonprofit Quarterly (June 26, 2013), available at-
h ttp://nonprofi tquarterly .org/2013/06/26/pro blems-migra te-
lessons-from-san-francisco-s-homeless-population-survey / 
[https://perma.cc/JHE8-7QS2] C' Almost 40% of San Francisco's 
homeless population became homeless in a city other than San 
Francisco. Most (24 % ) hail from California, but many (15%) from 
around the United States."). 
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patrols, and the police would have been unlikely to recognize 
Witness when not in the presence of Victim. Realistically, the 
pastor and Victim were more likely to spot Witness than were 
randomly dispatched bike patrols. Additionally, on the eve of 
trial, the prosecution also contacted the jail to see if Witness 
might once again be incarcerated. They learned he was not. 
1114 Whether the prosecution "could have done more to 
ensure . . . [Witness] showed up for the trial" is not the issue; 
instead, we consider whether the prosecution's efforts were 
reasonable. As the State noted, "[a] good faith search does not 
mean that every lead, no matter how nebulous, must be tracked 
to the ends of the earth," Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 (10th 
Cir. 1974), and we conclude that the State acted reasonably even 
though "[Witness] could [neither] be located nor produced in 
court," Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894. 
115 Indeed, the instant case is, in our estimation, an even 
stronger case for affirmance than Drawn because here Defendant 
acquiesced in both the method of keeping tabs on Witness and in 
the means of serving him notice of the trial. First, the prosecution 
told the magistrate at the preliminary hearing that the pastor 
was the best way to stay in contact with Witness. If Defendant 
had an objection to this method of communication as a substitute 
for more formal service, unusual though it may have been, the 
time to contest it was not at trial but at the preliminary hearing 
when it was first proposed. Where "there is 'apparent[] if not 
complete acquiescence [in] what the court did as a matter of 
procedure,' '[n]either party is in a position to complain as to 
[that] procedure' on appeal." Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291, 
114 n.9, 364 P.3d 60 (alterations in original) (quoting Hodges v. 
Smoot, 125 P.2d 419, 421 (Utah 1942)). Second, Defendant 
explicitly accepted the prosecution's proffer of its efforts to get 
Witness to appear. For example, although Defendant faults the 
trial court for "not even attempt[ing] to get testimony from the 
pastor regarding the service to [Wih1ess ]," in doing so he ignores 
the fact that the trial court offered him the opportunity to get 
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such testimony from the pastor-an opportunity that he 
declined. Because the prosecution made reasonable efforts to 
locate Witness, though perhaps not all efforts "humanly 
possible," we agree with the trial court that the prosecution 
acted in good faith, and we conclude that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding Witness to be unavailable for 
purposes of rule 804. 
II. Witness's Testimony Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 804. 
Cfil6 If the potential witness is unavailable, prior testimony 
may be admitted if the witness gave the testimony "as a wih1ess 
at a ... hearing," Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(l)(A), and the testimony is 
"offered against a party who had ... an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination," 
id. R. 804(b)(l)(B). Because a preliminary hearing is a "hearing" 
under rule 804(b)(l)(A), the introduction of preliminary hearing 
testimony may be allowed in lieu of the in-court testimony of the 
witness if the court finds the potential witness to be unavailable: 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah 1981). Rule 804(b)(l)(B) 
essentially incorporates the requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause of the United States Constitution. See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) (holding that the 
Confrontation Clause does not "allow[] admission of testimonial 
statements of a wih1ess who [does] not appear at trial unless he 
[is] unavailable to testify, and the defendant ha[s] had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination"). It is instructive that in 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that if a witness is unavailable, preliminary 
hearing testimony is admissible under the Confrontation Clause 
because the circumstances of a preliminary hearing 
closely approximat[ e] those that surround the 
typical trial. [The wih1ess is put] under oath; 
respondent [i]s represented by counsel . . . ; 
respondent ha[ s] every opportunity to cross-
examine [the witness] as to his statement; and the 
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proceedings [a]re conducted before a judicial 
tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of 
the hearings. 
Id. at 165. The Court determined that, under such circumstances, 
a party opposing introduction of preliminary hearing testimony 
"had an effective opportunity for confrontation." Id. 
<j[17 Regarding the requirement that a party be given "an 
opportunity" to develop the testimony of the witness, Utah R. 
Evid. 804(b)(l)(B), the rule refers to the opportunity to examine 
the witness, not to whether the defendant actually availed 
himself of that opportunity, State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 
<j[ 18, 314 P.3d 1014. The opportunity for cross-examination 
"satisfie[s] the requirements of [the Constitution and the Rules of 
Evidence]." Id. <j[ 20. This principle is well-established in Utah 
law, predating even the codification of the Rules of Evidence. 
See, e.g., State v. King, 68 P. 418, 419 (Utah 1902) ("By taking the 
testimony of the witness ... in the presence of the accused upon 
the examination at a time when he had the privilege of cross-
examination, this constitutional privilege is satisfied, provided 
the witness cannot, with due diligence, be found .... The 
constitutional requirement of confrontation is not violated by 
dispensing with the actual presence of the witness at the trial, 
after he has already been subjected to cross-examination by the 
accused[.]"). 
<j[18 During the preliminary hearing, Defendant had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Witness; indeed, he admits as 
much in his appellate brief. It is therefore irrelevant whether trial 
counsel voluntarily elected to forgo some aspect of cross-
examination due to counsel's strategy.7 Garrido, 2013 UT App 
7. Defendant makes much of the fact that the prosecution knew 
procuring Witness's testimony at trial would be more difficult 
than in the typical case because Witness was a homeless person. 
(continued ... ) 
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245, «JI 18. Indeed, forgoing or minimizing cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing is a common practice among the defense 
bar.8 But Defendant was not denied the opportunity to cross-
examine Witness. 
( ... continued) 
True enough. But like the prosecution, defense counsel knew 
that Witness was homeless. Defense counsel was likewise aware 
that the prosecution might have difficulty in securing the 
testimony of Witness and Victim at trial. In such a context,· 
defense counsel could have anticipated that Witness and/or 
Victim might not be physically present at trial and that, if 
deemed unavailable, their testimony would be read for the jury. 
In the case of homelessness and similar circumstances-such as 
where a potential witness is terminally ill, seriously mentally ill, 
suicidal, a known drug addict, or an active-duty soldier who 
may be called up for combat deployment -there is a distinct 
possibility that the wih1ess may vanish or otherwise become 
unavailable before trial. It may behoove defense counsel in such 
cases to take full advantage of any opportunity to cross-examine 
such wib1esses. Then, if the testimony is read at trial, counsel's 
cross-examination is part of what will be read, and the jury will 
have a less one-sided version of the wib1ess's testimony. 
8. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent in California v. Gteen, 399 
U.S. 149 (1970), the case in which the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that preliminary hearing testimony may be 
admissible under the prior testimony hearsay exception, id. at 
165, articulated several reasons for this common practice, id. at 
197 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He noted, 
First ... the objective of [ a preliminary] hearing is 
to establish the presence or absence of probable 
cause, not guilt or innocence proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt; thus, if evidence suffices to 
establish probable cause, defense counsel has little 
reason at the preliminary hearing to show that it 
(continued ... ) 
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State v. Goins 
<_II19 As noted previously, however, hearsay testimony is 
admissible under the prior testimony exception if, and only if, 
the party offering the evidence can show that the party opposing 
the introduction of the evidence had both "opportunity and 
similar motive to develop it." Utah R. Evid. 804(b )(1 )(B) 
(emphasis added). To this end, Defendant, relying upon 
persuasive authority only, attempts to convince this court that 
( ... continued) 
does not conclusively establish guilt .... Second, 
neither defense nor prosecution is eager before trial 
to disclose its case by extensive examination at the 
preliminary hearing; thorough questioning of a 
prosecution witness by defense counsel may easily 
amount to a grant of gratis discovery to the State. 
Third, the schedules of neither court nor counsel 
can easily accommodate lengthy preliminary 
hearings. Fourth, even were the judge and lawyers 
not concerned that the proceedings be brief, the 
defense and prosecution have generally had 
inadequate time before the hearing to prepare for 
extensive examination. Finally, though counsel 
were to engage in extensive questioning, a part of 
its force would never reach the trial factfinder, who 
would know the examination only second hand. 
Id. See also Right of Confrontation: Substantive Use at Trial of Friot 
Statements, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 108, 114 (1970) (characterizing as 
"troubling" "the [Supreme] Court's use of ... preliminary 
hearing testimony" at trial, on the ground that 11it had been 
subject to cross-examination," because "[g]enerally, there is little 
motivation for comprehensive cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing"). Whatever the truth of these sentiments, 
they are not reflected in Utah law, see supra <JI 18; therefore, 
members of the defense bar might do well to heed our 
suggestions in appropriate cases, see supra 1[ 18 note 7. 
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when "[t]rial counsel ... initially questioned [Wih1ess], at the 
preliminary hearing, ... she did not have [the] same motive as 
she would have had at trial." Defendant further states that "[t]he 
purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine probable cause, 
not [to] prov[e] the cause beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the 
cross-examination may not have been as thorough because they 
are only focusing on the basis for the arrest." We are not 
unsympathetic to this argument, but the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly foreclosed it in State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), 
which is overlooked in Defendant's briefs on appeal. 
c_i[20 Dismissing as meritless arguments identical to those raised 
by Defendant in this case, our Supreme Court concluded in 
Brooks that "counsel's motive and interest are the same in either 
[the trial or preliminary hearing] setting; he acts in both 
situations in the interest of and motivated by establishing the 
innocence of his client. Therefore, cross-examination takes place 
at preliminary hearing and at trial under the same motive and 
interest." Id. at 541. Thus, adhering to the rationale of Brooks, we 
determine that Defendant's challenge is unavailing, and we 
affirm the decision of the trial court to admit Wih1ess' s 
preliminary hearing testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
Cjf21 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 
Witness's preliminary hearing testimony when it found that 
Witness was unavailable to testify because, under the 
circumstances, the State made reasonable efforts to procure the 
testimony of Witness at trial. Because Defendant had an 
appropriate opportunity to cross-examine Witness, Witness's 
testimony from that hearing was admissible under rule 804. 
1122 Affirmed. 
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Addendum B 
United States Code Annotated 
Constitution of the United States 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI-Jury trials 
Amendment VI. Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
U .C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 12 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
··im Article I. Declaration of Rights 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
· and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropri~te discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6, § 1. adopted at election Nov. 8. 1994. eff. Jan. 1. 1995. 
West's Utah Code Am1otated 
State Court Rules 
Title V. General Provisions 
Rules App.Proc., Rule 35 
RULE 35. PETITION FOR REHEARING 
(a) Petition for rehearing permitted. A rehearing will not be granted in the 
absence of a petition for rehearing. A petition for rehearing may be filed only in 
cases in which the court has issued an opinion, memorandum decision, or per 
curiam decision. No other petitions for rehearing will be considered. 
(b) Time for filing. A petition for rehearing may be filed with the clerk 
within 14 days after issuance of the opinion, memorandum decision, or per 
curiam decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order. 
(c) Contents of petition. The petition shall state with particularity the 
points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or 
misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the petition as 
the petitioner desires. Counsel for petitioner must certify that the petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
( d) Oral argument. Oral argument in support of the petition will not be 
permitted. 
(e) Response. No response to a petition for rehearing will be received 
unless requested by the court. Any response shall be filed within 14 days after 
the entry of the order requesting the response, unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. A petition for rehearing will not be granted in the absence of a request for 
a response. 
(f) Form of petition. The petition shall be in a form prescribed by Rule 
27 and shall include a copy of the decision to which it is directed. 
(g) Number of copies to be filed and served. An original and 6 copies 
shall be filed with the court. Two copies shall be served on counsel for each party 
separately represented. 
(h) Length. Except by order of the court, a petition for rehearing and any 
response requested by the court shall not exceed 15 pages. 
(i) Color of cover. The cover of a petition for rehearing shall be tan; that of 
any response to a petition for rehearing filed by a party, white; and that of any 
response filed by an amicus curiae, green. All brief covers shall be of heavy cover 
stock. There shall be adequate contrast between the printing and the color of the 
cover. 
(j) Action by court if granted. If a petition for rehearing is granted, the 
court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument, or may 
restore it to the calendar for reargument or resubmission, or 1nay make such 
other orders as are deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the particular 
case. 
(k) Untimely or consecutive petitions. Petitions for rehearing that are not 
timely presented under this rule and consecutive petitions for rehearing will not 
be received by the clerk. 
(1) Amicus curiae. An amicus curiae may not file a petition for rehearing 
but may file a response to a petition if the court has requested a response under 
subparagraph (e) of this rule. 
Credits 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; April 1, 2004; June 1, 2010; November 1, 
2014.] 
✓,,, 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
YI/) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 14 
RULE 14. SUBPOENAS 
(a) Subpoenas requiring the attendance of a witness or interpreter and 
production or inspection of records, papers, or other objects. 
(a)(l) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before a 
court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or 
prosecution may be issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, 
the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon the direction of the 
grand jury, or the court in which an information or indictment is to be tried. The 
clerk of the court in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant, 
without charge, as many signed subpoenas as the defendant may require. An 
attorney admitted to practice in the court in which the action is pending may also 
issue and sign a subpoena as an officer of the court. 
(a)(2) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to appear 
and testify or to produce in court or to allow inspection of records, papers or 
other objects, other than those records pertaining to a victim covered by 
Subsection (b). The court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance 
would be unreasonable. 
(a)(3) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years who is 
not a party. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the 
witness or interpreter personally and notifying the witness or interpreter of the 
contents. A peace officer shall serve any subpoena delivered for service in the 
peace officer's county. 
(a)(4) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to the court 
and to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, stating the time ~nd 
place of service and by whom service was made. 
(a)(5) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness from anywhere in the 
state. 
(a)(6) When a person required as a witness is in custody within the state, the 
court may order the officer having custody of the witness to bring the witness 
before the court. 
(a)(7) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a 
contempt of the court responsible for its issuance. 
(a)(8) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, or is so ill or infirm 
as to afford reasonable grounds for believing that the witness will be unable to 
attend a trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the other, apply to the 
court for an order that the witness be examined conditionally by deposition. 
Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The 
defendant shall be present at the deposition and the court shall make whatever 
order is necessary to effect such attendance. 
(b) Subpoenas for the production of records of victim. 
(b)(l) No subpoena or court order compelling the production of medical, mental 
health, school, or other non-public records pertaining to a victim shall be issued 
by or at the request of the defendant unless the court finds after a hearing, upon 
notice as provided below, that the defendant is entitled to production of the 
records sought under applicable state and federal law. 
(b)(2) The request for the subpoena or court order shall identify the records 
sought with particularity and be reasonably limited as to subject matter. 
(b)(3) The request for the subpoena or court order shall be filed with the court as 
soon as practicable, but no later than 28 days before trial, or by such other time as 
permitted by the court. The request and notice of any hearing shall be served on 
counsel for the victim or victim's representative and on the prosecutor. Service 
on an unrepresented victim shall be made on the prosecutor. 
(b)(4) If the court makes the required findings under subsection (b)(l), it shall 
issue a subpoena or order requiring the production of the records to the court. 
The court shall then conduct an in camera review of the records and disclose to 
the defense and prosecution only those portions that the defendant has 
demonstrated a right to inspect. 
(b)(S) The court may, in its discretion or upon motion of either party or the victim 
or the victim's representative, issue any reasonable order to protect the privacy of 
the victim or to limit dissemination of disclosed records. 
(b)(6) For purposes of this rule, "victim" and "victim's representative" are used 
as defined in Utah Code Am1. § 77-38-2(2). 
(c) Applicability of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The provisions of Rule 45, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, shall govern the 
content, issuance, and service of subpoenas to the extent that those provisions are 
consistent with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Credits 
[Amended effective November 1, 1996; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2007; 
November 1, 2015.] 
West's Utah Code Annotated (West 2014) 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
RULE 804. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY--WHEN THE DECLARANT IS 
UNAVAILABLE AS A WITNESS 
(a) Criteria for Being Unavailable. A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if 
the declarant: 
(1) is exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's statement 
because the court rules that a privilege applies; 
(2) refuses to testify about the subject matter despite a court order to do so; 
(3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter; 
( 4) cannot be present or testify at the trial or hearing because of death or a then-existing 
infirmity, physical illness, or mental illness; or 
(5) is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, by 
process or other reasonable means, to procure the declarant's attendance. 
But this subdivision (a) does not apply if the statement's proponent procured or wrongfully 
caused the declarant's unavailability as a witness in order to prevent the declarant from 
attending or testifying. · 
(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant 
is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony that: 
(A) was given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, whether given 
during the current proceeding or a different one; and 
(B) is now offered against a party who had--or, in a civil case, whose predecessor 
in interest had--an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, 
or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement Under the Belief of Imminent Death. In a civil or criminal case, a 
statement made by the declarant while believing the declarant's death to be imminent, if 
the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that: 
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if the 
person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the 
declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to 
invalidate the declarant's claim against someone else or to expose the declarant 
to civil or criminal liability; and 
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its 
trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability. 
(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A statement about: 
CREDIT(S) 
(A) the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, 
relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, 
even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that 
fact; or 
(B) another person concerning any of these facts, as well as death, if the 
declarant was related to the person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so 
intimately associated with the person's family that the declarant's information is 
likely to be accurate. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2004; December 1, 2011.] 
2011 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to 
make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the 
rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in 
any ruling on evidence admissibility. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Subdivision (a) is comparable to Rule 63(7) [Rule 62(7) ], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule 
62(7)[ (e) ], Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be encompassed in Rule 804(a)(S). 
Subdivision (a)(S) is a modification of the federal rule which permits judicial discretion to be 
applied in determining unavailability of a witness. 
Subdivision (b)(l) is comparable to Rule 63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former 
rule is broader to the extent that it did not limit the admission of the testimony to a situation 
where the party to the action had the interest and opportunity to develop the testimony. Condas 
v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981). 
Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former 
rule was not limited to declarations concerning the cause or circumstances of the impending 
death nor did it limit dying declarations in criminal prosecutions to homicide cases. The rule has 
been modified by making it applicable to any civil or criminal proceeding, subject to the 
qualification that the judge finds the statement to have been made in good faith. 
Subdivision (b)(3) is comparable to Rule 63(10), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), though it does 
not extend merely to social interests. 
Subdivision (b)( 4) is similar to Rule 63(24), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Subdivision (b)(S) [deleted in 2004] had no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
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begin with picking the jury tomorrow morning because we will 
have been able to address all preliminary matters today, 
okay? 
What is the preliminary motion that you wish to 
address at this time? 
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, the preliminary motion is 
this, Gabriel Estrada who is the listed victim in Count 3, we 
have gone to some lengths to try to procure his attendance 
here today -
THE COURT: Proffer those efforts for me, please. 
MR. LEAVITT: And what those - as an offer of proof, 
Your Honor, what those efforts were was about a month ago -
in order to procure his attendance at the preliminary 
hearing, both of these witnesses in this case are homeless. 
Their address is a shelter and so as the Court knows, there's 
a very transient nature to that and it's sometimes hard to 
locate people. In order to do that for the preliminary 
hearing what we did is we contacted the Salt Lake City Bike 
Police and were able to find them mostly based on Jacob 
Omar's appearance because as a result of this case he has a 
missing earlobe. They were able to do that and when they did 
that Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar both came to the preliminary 
hearing. When they did so they brought a person they 
referred as their pastor whose name was Russ. He's part of 
the K-2 Church and he's in charge - he was at the time in 
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charge of community outreach, so a lot of his, a lot of his 
job and a lot of his responsibilities dealt with, you know, 
getting to know the people in the area, watching out for 
them, helping them out, helping them through the process. 
Russ was the person who was the contact 'cause, of course, 
these two homeless people don't have cell phones or any way 
that I can contact them regularly. Russ had brought them to 
the prelirn and I had spoke with Russ and spoke with them at 
the prelim and asked them if it's okay if I go through Russ 
to contact them and let them know when we get a trial date 
and they agreed to that, both Mr. Estrada and Mr. Omar did 
that. I kept in contact with Russ and I had emailed him a 
subpoena. Russ informed me - and I emailed that subpoena 
about a month ago. Russ informed that he did have the 
opportunity to serve both Mr. Omar and Mr. Estrada those 
subpoenas letting them know the court date and letting them 
know that they needed to be here. Now, he since that time -
I maintained some contact with Russ just to make sure that he 
tabs on them as the trial was getting closer. Russ left that 
job for another job and his replacement, Jason, whose here 
today with Mr. Omar, they're in the conference room. He was 
kind of taking over for Russ and was aware of the situation, 
was able to verify that indeed Russ did serve the subpoena on 
Gabriel Estrada. They both informed me that in the last few 
weeks Mr. Estrada has come into some trouble. He was in jail 
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at one point. I checked the jail yesterday, he's not there 
now, he was actually released on September 24th. We checked 
it again about a week ago and I checked yesterday to see if 
he'd been returned to jail, he's not. So he's not in jail at 
this point. 
Mr. Omar and the community pastor have let me know 
that they've lost touch with him. I guess Mr. Omar and Mr. 
Estrada have kind of had a falling out and so they were 
concerned that he may not be here today. He did have a 
subpoena, he did know about the court date but - and again, 
Jason, the new cowmunity outreach person, I had him watching 
for Gabriel the last couple of days to see if he saw him to 
make contact with him. He did not. He said he doesn't run 
around in that area any more and he's kind of involved with a 
different crowd, but again, his whereabouts are unknown. 
Our position, Your Honor, is that we have - he's 
been served by process and we 1 ve gone to additional means to 
try to find this witness, he's unavailable and so again, this 
is going to take a two-part test. So I'm just addressing 
unavailability now and so the Court asked for a proffer of 
what we've done, that's what we've done to try to procure his 
attendance, he's not here today. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to address 
different steps or do you want - that's fine. 
MR. LEAVITT: And we can address unavailability and 
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then if we get to there I think we can address the rule. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. VENABLE: Your Honor, I'll address -
THE COURT: Mr. Venable then. 
MR. VENABLE: In the United States Supreme Court 
and the Utah Courts have held that the right to confront 
witnesses at trial and to provide the fact finder an 
opportunity to access their credibility, cannot be lightly 
dismissed. I know the Court of Appeals in State v. Tron said 
that for a witness to be constitutionally unavailable, it 
must practically impossible to produce the witness in court 
and, you know, in this case, in State v. Tron, they found 
that the witness was unavailable but that was because the 
O.A. subpoenaed that witness three times, they had their 
detective on the case search for him, go to the last known 
addresses. They had the detective, you know, calling family 
members. Detective search consisted of questioning police 
informants, searching police files and working with Salt Lake 
County investigators to try and procure the attendance of 
that witness. You know, in this case the subpoena wasn't 
even served by, you know, a member of the police or the 
attorney's office, it was emailed to a pastor and then passed 
along. That's just simply not enough to meet the prong of 
unavailability. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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Any further response on that? 
MR. LEAVITT: Our response, Your Honor, is simply 
as far as different cases that have addressed the issue, in 
Brown vs. Heathman, the 1987 case in Utah, in that one they 
didn't even try to serve the person because they didn't they 
were here because they didn't know where they were and so 
they didn't even serve them and the Court in that case - and 
I have copies for counsel [inaudible]. 
In that case, Your Honor, you can simply look at 
page, Page 3 it just says at the very bottom of that 
Paragraph 2 at the very bottom, (inaudible) in order to show 
an inability of attendance of a witness the opponent must -
of prior testimony must always attempt service of process. 
But then it talks about other reasonable means and does not 
require (inaudible) attempt to serve a subpoena on a witness. 
We served a subpoena on the witness here. We've gone further 
than this. 
As far as the notion that when we start arguing 
ability to cross examine and confront a witness, again, we'll 
get to that when we get to the prior testimony but the issue 
that that raises is whether or not Mr. Goins has had the 
opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness. What 
we are asking the Court to offer is prior preliminary hearing 
testimony. Ms. Singleton who is his attorney now had the 
opportunity to cross examine Mr. Estrada about this. They 
7 
--------- ___ ... ________ ,._._., ______ . __ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
had an opportunity to confront him about everything that's 
going to be coming in. There was a complete cross 
examination. There were not even any objections made and the 
Court didn't stop the cross examination, the Court didn't 
limit the cross examination. Defense was able to cross 
examine him and ferret out any truth or bias or anything that 
they wanted to do and that's what he's entitled to 
constitutionally. He was given that right at the preliminary 
hearing, it's a complete transcript. That's what we're 
asking to offer. 
Under - I suppose now is probably as good a time as 
any to talk about where we're offering the exception which is 
804(b) (1) which is former testimony and indeed it is 
testimony that was given at a hearing and is now offered 
against the party who had an opportunity and similar motive 
to develop and cross and redirect examination which they were 
able to do. 
As far as his right to confront a witness, he's had 
that right with this testimony. We're not offering an 1102 
statement, we're not offering an out-of-court statement. It 
was a statement that was made in court, at a prior proceeding 
in this case under oath in which Mr. Goins had ample 
opportunity to confront and cross examine the witness. 
Again, are there more things that we could do? 
Sure, we could send out, we could send out an army of people 
8 
_ _J 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
to try to find that person but that's not what we're required 
to do under the rule. The requirement is that the Court is 
persuaded that we have acted in good faith, with reasonable 
diligence to try to locate a witness and we've been unable to 
do so. We have done that. The one person who I had contact 
with, with this homeless man, I maintained that contact. He 
served him a subpoena. Mr. Estrada has that subpoena and 
he's not here. The rule says that if the person is served, 
that they're absent from the trial and we've not been able to 
get them by process, that's what that subpoena is. He was 
served in process. That's it. We don't even get to 
reasonable means. We've gone above that and tried to go to 
other reasonable means to locate people who know him and try 
to find him but we've been unable to do that. But it doesn't 
matter because he was served a subpoena. He's not here today 
and we've done what we can to get him here. Again, the 
confrontation right has been fulfilled, we're offering 
preliminary hearing testimony and nothing else. 
THE COURT: Do you want to address the 
confrontation issue? 
MS. SINGLETON: Yes, Your Honor I can address that 
issue. Your Honor, the Supreme Court of Utah has held that 
the (inaudible) confrontation law does not apply to 
preliminary hearings and although, under the rules for the 
admission of former testimony, you know, as far as having had 
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an opportunity, a prior opportunity to cross examine the 
witness which, yes, there was a preliminary hearing in this 
case and yes, we did have the opportunity to cross examine 
Mr. Estrada, I would submit that that is - that would still 
violate my client's right to confront and c~oss examine the 
witnesses against him by admitting this testimony at trial. 
The reason being that under 804 (b) ( 1) (b) it specifically 
states that you had an opportunity and similar motive to 
develop it by direct, cross, or redirect examination and in 
these preliminary hearings there is an abbreviated procedure 
and quite frankly, Your Honor, the motive in developing 
testimony is different at a preliminary hearing than it is at 
trial. We frequently ask questions during preliminary 
hearings that we would not ask at trial because evidence is 
admissible at trial - or at a preliminary hearing but not 
necessarily is admissible in a trial. The rules of evidence 
are different and - or, or by the same token, we don't ask 
question that we might ask at a trial because credibility 
determinations are not being made a preliminary hearing. The 
Court making the probable cause determination is not 
assessing the credibility of a witness, therefore we do not 
ask those questions to get that information out. So I don't 
believe that the motive of developing that testimony is the 
same at a preliminary hearing as it would be at trial and 
therefore it would violate my client's right to confront and 
10 
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cross examine the witnesses against him by admitting this 
testimony, the preliminary hearing testimony at trial. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. LEAVITT: May I just briefly address the S~xth 
Amendment issue? The fact the Supreme Court said that that 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation would not apply to 
prelim, that's being used in reverse here. What they're 
saying is that you don't get every single witness at a 
preliminary hearing. You don't get to have that right to 
confront them. Now, when they're there and you've confronted 
them, that right to confrontation has been fulfilled. But 
what that case is saying is it's saying that reliable hearsay 
can be admitted at a preliminary hearing and you can't insist 
on every single witness being at a preliminary hearing, not 
the reverse. It's not that you don't have that right, that 
right may be fulfilled at the preliminary hearing, it's just 
that they can't necessarily assert that right at a 
preliminary hearing, and again, as we know, as a matter 
(inaudible) every - in this instance had I objected to say, 
Hey, these are questions about credibility, this is beyond 
the scope of this hearing and Ms. Singleton had been shut 
down, I can see how possibly they didn't get a complete cross 
examination. But as we know, as a matter of course, every 
cross examination at every single prelim, we talk about 
inferences, statements, we talk about bias, we talk about all 
11 
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of these things that she's saying they don't have a motive to 
do but that's what the cross examination at preliminary 
hearing is about. They had an opportunity to confront that 
witness, it's been fulfill~d and ~o th~ testimony should be 
admitted. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
I'm going to address first of all the initial prong 
of whether or not this witness is actually unavailable and 
the parties have been willing to do as I ask, to just go on 
proffer of what the State has done. Are both parties willing 
to accept those proffers with out contesting the proffers of 
what they've done to serve him without bringing in the -
without hearing from Jason I guess is who the witness we have 
here. Are you willing to accept those proffers as far as the 
availability issue goes? 
MS. SINGLETON: I'll accept the proffer, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right and I do find that based on 
the proffer of what the State has done to procure this 
witness's testimony, that he is unavailable under Rule 804 as 
far as that first prong goes. 
The key for that for me is that he knew about when 
this hearing was, I mean, whether the service is actually 
done by law enforcement officer or a pastor or a friend or a 
neighbor or a spouse or someone's whose at the home when it's 
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delivered by ma·il, the key is is I cannot find fairly that 
someone is unavailable if they really do not know when this 
trial is. All indications are that this person, even before 
he was in jail and released from jail on September 24th was 
aware of this court date and had, in fact, come to a 
preliminary hearing, so knew the proceeding was going. I am 
finding that for the requirements of Rule 804 - and we are 
dealing specifically with subsection A, sub-5 in this case, 
that the State did do reasonable means of process and, in 
fact, due process has actually occurred as far as trying to 
get Mr. Estrada here and he is not here. He has not 
appeared. This is the time set for this hearing, in fact 
we're an hour past the time when he would have been 
subpoenaed to have come in and meet with them and he is not 
present. 
As we go to the next prong and that is the next 
part of this analysis, argument has been made that the right 
to confrontation is met if the defendant, defense counsel or 
opposing counsel of the witness has had an opportunity to 
cross examine under circumstances that would provide a 
similar motive. That is what's key here, was it the same 
type of a cross examination and opportunity that it meets the 
criteria needed for Rule 804? I have not read the 
preliminary hearing. Has that been given to me and I just 
don't, haven't received it electronically? 
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MR. LEAVITT: I have a copy, Your Honor, for the 
Court. 
THE COURT: How do the parties, I do need to have a 
tbpy-bf it so I'll··use yours -
that. 
MS. SINGLETON: Your Honor, we don't have a copy of 
THE COURT: I don't know that it had been filed -
MR. LEAVITT: It's the first witness -
THE COURT: - electronically and the attorneys are 
the same. Mr. Leavitt, you were the prosecutor at the 
preliminary hearing and Ms. Singleton you were the attorney? 
MR. LEAVITT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And what is the process that the 
parties anticipate in doing this, that they would actually 
have role players get up and read and just do this exchange? 
MR. LEAVITT: I think there's probably a couple of 
options. Ms. Singleton has the audio of that which is where 
this was created from. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. LEAVITT: I would like, I would suggest that if 
we can play it and see if it plays clearly on the court's 
system I think if it comes in, I think playing the audio is 
good enough. If it's fuzzy and you can't hear it very well, 
possibly playing it and following along with the transcript. 
Since we have an audio, I prefer to do that than have role 
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2 the Court prefers as well. 
3 THE COURT: And any suggestions as far as how the 
4· ·defer'fse would like that to go? And l realize· we' re ·one· -step-
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to what the opportunities and fairness ... 
MS. SINGLETON: I guess, Your Honor, I think either 
we just - I think we probably should just play it. I don't 
want to have, I don't want the jury to be reading it. I 
don't know that we necessarily need to have it be role played 
but, but as a followup argument, Your Honor, with respect to 
the admission of this testimony, a lot of what - as the Court 
if you read through it, a lot of what this is are Mr. Estrada 
making motions that are not, again, they're not really 
adequately described I don't think. I think it's going to be 
very unclear and potentially, you know, confusing or 
prejudicial to my client and to the jury to be listening to 
something or reading something that's not, that isn't clear 
in terms of what he's referring to or what motions he's 
actually making. 
THE COURT: Part of my question in that is even if 
the testimony is allowed is either party asking to strike any 
of the preliminary hearing testimony or is the motion that 
the testimony as it was? 
MR. LEAVITT: I don't have anything to strike. 
------------ -·--··-·--·------
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THE COURT: Okay. And there's nothing stricken 
here and there hasn't been a copy provided with anything that 
would be objectionable and as Mr. Leavitt has suggested in 
4"" .. , .. his· argument, I ··don't ·see even any objections ·that··were ··rul-ed 
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on. Am I missing any? 
MS. SINGLETON: No, Your Honor, I don't believe so. 
The one thing that I think should be stricken from this if it 
were admitted is there are some, at some point there is a 
reference to an allegation made by Mr. Estrada that my client 
had previously stolen his bike which I think would be 
essentially 404B evidence of which we've had no notice of an 
intent to introduce that kind of thing. 
THE COURT: What line and page do you have? 
MS. SINGLETON: It would have been, I'm sorry, Your 
Honor, (inaudible) . 
MR. VENABLE: 185ish, 186. 
MS. SINGLETON: (Inaudible) that's 185 and then -
THE COURT: I do have 185 where he talks about 
"when I found out my bike ended up missing"? 
MR. LEAVITT: If that's all there is, I don't even 
see that accusation there. 
THE COURT: I just see it -
MR. LEAVITT: Pretty innocuous to me. 
THE COURT: - No. 185. All right. That - it's 
really kind of peripheral to the issue that I have to make. 
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Now that I have had an opportunity to -
MS. SINGLETON: Your Honor, if I could -
THE COURT: Yeah, uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. S'!NGLETON:' - •jus·t· make ···one· more··point--·about, --r 
mean, with respect to what I would have done differently, you 
know, in terms of -
THE COURT: 'Cause that is the issue, that's the 
argument. 
MS. SINGLETON: Right, and that, you know, there 
are a lot of comments, you know, and statements that Mr. 
Estrada made during this that I believe go to his credibility 
in terms of, you know, you know, he kind of goes back and 
forth on some issues about where he was the night before, how 
he knew and the last time he saw my client was and the last 
time, you know, and a lot of that goes to his credibility and 
that I did not develop as thoroughly as, you know, I would 
have, as I was intending to do today in the trial because it 
didn't matter at the preliminary hearing. What we were 
focusing on was more of the, you know, facts of the actual 
encounter and so again, with respect to the motive, it was 
not the same motive to cross. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any further response on that 
argument? 
MR. LEAVITT: I think the same motive is there. If 
you look at the transcript, anytime you look at what we do in 
17 
·----·-···------------------- -----------·-·-•···--·----····• - . 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the court we can see different things that we may have done 
differently or may have done better, .that doesn't mean that 
we didn't have a motive to ferret out the truth or to 
THE COURT: All right. All right. This takes an 
analysis of the rule itself and the purposes behind the rule. 
If the opportunity to cross examine at a preliminary hearing 
that is required by this rule meant that the defense attorney 
needed to be able to see into the future and know that this 
is the testimony that would be using at trial and to cross as 
though you would at trial to test credibility issues, then 
the rule would be meaningless. So I don't find that that's 
what the rule requires. 
What it requires is an opportunity to cross with a 
similar motive. There are cases and, in fact, multiple cases 
in just the last little while that this has been an issue 
where I said that the opportunity for cross examination was 
not there precisely because every question was met with an 
objection because it wasn't the sort of thing that needed to 
be dealt with at preliminary hearing or it was - that was 
something that would be saved for trial and even though the 
defense attorney had been in court and been able to stand up 
and question the witness, there really had been no meaningful 
opportunity for cross. 
That simply is not the case here. This is a case 
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1 where this witness was on the stand under oath, testifying as 
2 to the exact incidents that are at issue here and this is 
3 precisely the circumstances that Rule 804 allows and I am 
4- · admitting,·••·I• am.ruling for••••the•State •in. -this.that -the. 
5 admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of Gabriel 
6 Estrada is appropriate under Rule 804(a) (5); however, there 
7 still needs to be a clean presentation of this to the jury. 
8 The concern about presenting a jury a written 
9 statement means I don't ever do that because it just gives 
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too much weight when they see something in writing and 
everything else is by question and answer at trial. If the 
parties agree that the recording is a way to do it, then that 
is something that I will consider looking to that 
stipulation. 
Another way to do it - and sometimes that's the 
cleaner way to do it is just simply have parties role playing 
that questioning so that the jury is seeing it the same way 
and in that type of a situation the parties can go through 
and with rulings by the Court, strike anything that is not 
appropriate coming in. So far there's only been the only 
objection on that and it may be that the statement about the 
taking of the bike earlier is for prior acts that you want to 
have stricken. It may be that there can be some cleaning of 
the - I noted that there was a part where another witness 
comes in in the middle and it's kind of disruptive and very 
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often at preliminary hearing, preliminary hearing are work 
hearings and extraneous things are going on. That's usually 
the cleaner way. Because we don't have the jury coming in 
today· we do have some time to do that· and so I am· instructing·· 
the attorneys to get together, given my ruling that I am 
going to allow the preliminary hearing upon which Mr. Estrada 
was cross examined that the defendant at least had the 
opportunity for cross examination to come in and look at how 
they want to present it without any of the extraneous of 
other matters happening. Anything else -
MR. LEAVITT: We can discuss that. 
THE COURT: Anything else we need to address on 
this issue itself? 
MS. SINGLETON: Not on this issue, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are there other preliminary issues? 
Now we do have I believe - we don't need to take all day that 
we were planning to go for trial but we do have some time so 
that we can immediately get to the issues. Jury instructions 
have already been presented. Has the defense presented some? 
I think -
MS. SINGLETON: I do have them, Your Honor, right 
here. 
THE COURT: Okay, so I've got that and we can go 
over that. I smiled at the verdict form that had been 
prepared by the State because that was an issue on another 
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Addendum D 
INSTRUCTION NO. ·z_.y 
You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a defendant to establish 
self-defense by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence. The laws of Utah require the 
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-defense. If the defendant 
has done this, and if such evidence of self-defense, when considered in connection with all other 
evidence in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, then you must find 
him not guilty. 
The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to an acquittal if there is 
any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
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